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The purpose of this capstone project is to provide recommendations to Norwegian 
Special Operations Command (NORSOCOM) and Swedish Special Operations 
Command (SWESOCOM) on how to utilize and contribute to the U.S. Special 
Operations Command´s “Global Special Operations Forces Network” initiative. The 
project explains social network theory, analyzes the GSN, and suggests how 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM can manage their GSN membership. The research 
extends to include potential aspirations of a national network. 
The GSN effort is a thoroughly well-thought-out concept nested in U.S. strategy. 
USSOCOM’s leadership in the GSN can be described as informal, cooperative, and 
communicative with partner nations and agencies. The network has no alliance-like 
requirements, which makes membership for partner nations “low cost.” 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM have been forward-thinking, and are well 
positioned for an evolving GSN. However, from a network perspective, further actions 
are required to counter expected challenges and to utilize the membership more 
effectively. The national commands should inform national stakeholders to build support, 
establish national network managers, and participate in burden sharing. The GSN 
membership can provide the policy level with an alternative security cooperation forum 
that has access to information and resources. The GSN membership should be leveraged 
to enhance national networks. 
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In the 21st century, we must build partnerships that enable us to better 
meet a wider range of challenges. To that end, I see us building networks 
that leverage our unique capabilities—and the unique strength of our allies 
and partners that share common interest—to confront the critical 
challenges of the future. 
—U.S. Secretary of Defense Panetta 
June 28, 2012 
U.S. Institute of Peace 
 
A. THE NEW THREAT ENVIRONMENT 
From the 20th to the 21st century, the world has moved from the Cold War 
paradigm toward an asymmetric threat environment. In the current global context, there is 
no such thing as a local problem. Local threats have become globally networked.1 During 
a speech to the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community, then–U.S. Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton made the following statement:  
Extremist networks squeezed in one country migrate to others. Terrorist 
propaganda from a cell in Yemen can incite attacks as far away as Detroit 
or Delhi. A flu in Macao can become an epidemic in Miami. Technology 
and globalization have made our countries and our communities 
interdependent and interconnected. And today’s threats have become so 
complex, fast-moving, and cross-cutting that no one nation could ever 
hope to solve them alone.2 
Another development with these new threats is that networks are diversifying 
their activity, which results in the convergence of threats that were once distinct,3 as 
shown in Figure 1. 
                                                 
1 USSOCOM, SOF 2020, Global SOF Network, Tampa, Florida, 2013. Information folder. 
2 U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (speech, ISOF Week, Tampa, Florida, May 2012); 




Figure 1.  Global threat network.4 
Admiral William McRaven articulated USSOCOM’s awareness of the complex 
interdependence of today’s national security issues: 
We live in a world in which the threats have become increasingly 
networked and pose complex and dynamic risks to U.S. interests around 
the world. These networks are diversifying their activities, resulting in the 
convergence of threats that were once linear. In today’s environment, this 
convergence can have explosive and destabilizing effects—there is no 
such thing as a local problem.5 
Based on these complex national security issues, the United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) has identified five key trends that are shaping the 
strategic security environment and present unique challenges for the global force:6 
 The redistribution and diffusion of global power, 
 The rising role of non-state actors, 
 The easy access to advanced technology, to include information 
technology, 
                                                 
4 USSOCOM, SOF 2020, Global SOF Network, 6. 
5 Admiral William McRaven, Posture Statement before 113th Congress, House Armed Services 
Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, March 6, 2013, 2. 
6 USSOCOM, “Senior Leader Guide” (ISOF Conference 2014, Tampa, Florida. 19–21 May 2014), 10. 
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 Shifting demographics, specifically the rapid, turbulent expansion of the 
urban environment, and 
 The evolving, yet frail, economic health of the United States and its 
critical partners. 
The national strategies of Norway, Sweden, and the United States describe 
corresponding security threats for the 21st century. All three nations focus on 
asymmetrical and cross-border threats:7  
 Global terrorism, 
 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
 Trans-national illegal activities, 
 Cyber attacks, and 
 Regional armed conflicts. 
Strategists agree that the 21st century promises to be a very complex environment 
requiring flexible and proactive crisis management. It is especially the case for European 
countries whose common borders and relatively easy access provide opportunities for 
globalized threats to spread throughout the region.8 To counter these threats, the different 
security coalitions pursue similar strategies. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), for example, focuses on: proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of 
mass destruction; terrorism from extremist groups originating within the Alliance 
territory or from out-of-area regions; trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in 
arms, narcotics, and people; and cyber attacks towards government administrations, 
businesses, economies, and critical infrastructures.9 Similar threats are identified in the 
strategies of Norway, Sweden, the United States, the United Nations (UN), and the 
                                                 
7 Forsvarsdepartementet [Ministry of Defense]. Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og 
verdier [A Defense for Protection of Norway’s Security, Interests, and Resources], Parliamentary Bill no. 
48 (2007–2008) 2008; Forsvarsdepartementet [Ministry of Defense]. Et forsvar for vår tid [A Defense for 
Our Time]. Parliamentary Bill no. 73S (2011‒2012). 2012; Forsvarsdepartementet [Ministry of Defense]. 
Evne til Innsats: Strategisk konsept for Forsvaret [Capability for Effort: Strategic Concept for the 
Norwegian Defense]. 
8 Regjeringskansliet, Forsvarsdepartementet [Ministry of Defense]  “Veivalg i en Globalisert Verden.” 
[Choices in a Globalized World] (Stockholm, Sweden: Elander Sverige AB), 2013. 
9 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Strategic Concept: for the Defense and Security of the Members 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Lisbon, Portugal: NATO, 2012), 11; President of the United 
States, “2010 National Security Strategy,” U.S. Government Executive Branch (Washington, DC, May 
2010); President of the United States. 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, U.S. Government 
Executive Branch (Washington, DC, June 2011). 
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European Union (EU).10 As author Anne Holohan summarizes “the UN, NATO, OSCE 
[Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], and other political and military 
bodies and alliances all have to adapt to a truly interdependent world where borders are 
no longer sacrosanct and the tasks are not rigidly divided into military, civil, and 
political.”11 
USSOCOM is supporting a whole of government approach to address the current 
threats. The Command is developing a global network of Special Operations Forces 
working together with government agencies, allies, non-state actors, alliances, and 
partner nations. USSOCOM describes the international environment as having a 
character of “persistent instability”—something that requires SOF “persistent presence” 
in the future.12 In other words, USSOCOM’s response to a whole of government 
approach is called the Global SOF Network (GSN). 
1. USSOCOM’s Call for a Global SOF Network 
USSOCOM is developing the GSN concept to enhance its already global force by 
networking with its U.S. interagency counterparts, its foreign allies, and partners around 
the globe.13 The GSN’s primary goal is:  
A globally networked force of SOF, Interagency, Allies, and Partners able 
to rapidly and persistently address regional contingencies and threats to 
stability.14 
                                                 
10 See the different security strategies: NATO, Strategic Concept: for the Defense and Security of the 
Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (November 19‒20, 2010), 10‒13; Regeringskansliet 
[Ministry of Defense] En strategi för Sveriges säkerhet [A Strategy for Swedish Security] Ds 2006: 1, 16‒
17; European Union, Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: Towards a European Security 
Model (Brussels, Belgium: EU, February 23, 2010), 2‒6; Justis og Beredskapsdepartementet [Ministry of 
Justice], Terrorberedskap [Terrorism preparedness], white paper no. 21 (2012–2013), 2013. 
11 Anne Holohan, Networks of Democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005), 175. 
12 USSOCOM, Concept of Operations for the Global Special Operations Forces Network 2020 (GSN 
2020), July 29, 2013, 2, 15. 
13 Admiral McRaven, Posture statement before 113th Congress. 
14 The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment (Joint Special 
Operations University (JSOU) Report), ed. by Chuck Ricks (MacDill AFB, Florida: The JSOU Press, 
2013), 2. 
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The GSN consists of interagency partners and international partners, and is 
intended to better support the Geographical Combatant Command (GCC) and Theater 
Special Operations Command (TSOC). The idea is that the network gains expanded 
situational awareness of emerging threats and opportunities by enabling small, persistent 
presence in critical locations and facilitating engagement where necessary or appropriate. 
The networked approach is very successful in NATO, with the establishment of the 
NATO SOF Headquarters (NSHQ). It allows the United States and partner nations to 
share information, improve interoperability, and, when necessary, work together 
abroad.15 As Major General Michal Repass of Special Operations Command Europe 
(SOCEUR) noted, “No one nation can do it all, but every nation can do something.”16 
In his article “Global SOF and Interagency Collaboration,” defense analyst 
Christopher Lamb highlights the imperative of multilateral and interagency collaboration 
to navigate the current threat environment effectively with not only a direct, but also a 
very robust indirect approach. Successful indirect operations require a high degree of 
interagency collaboration to create a holistic approach.17 
Admiral McRaven, in his testimony to the U.S. Congress, stated that the SOF 
network represents a way to improve support for the GCCs and chiefs of mission (COM) 
and empower a global effort with capable allies and partners. Recognizing that actors 
need to learn from each other, SOF partners are expected to build mutual trust, foster 
enduring relationships, and provide new opportunities to effect shared challenges.18 
Admiral McRaven´s successor as Commander of USSOCOM, General Joseph L. 
Votel confirmed the way ahead for the GSN effort in his congressional testimony. 
In order to thwart expanding trans-regional threat networks and violent 
extremist organizations, USSOCOM must outpace the growth of threat 
                                                 
15 Admiral McRaven, Posture statement before 113th Congress. 
16 MG Michael Repass, “Panel Presentation: SOF and the Indirect Approach to Conflict Prevention” 
(speech, National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict 
(SO/LIC) Symposium in Washington, DC, January 28‒30, 2013). 
17 Christopher Lamb, “Global SOF and Interagency Collaboration,” Journal of Strategic Security 7, 
no. 2 (2013). 
18 Admiral McRaven, Posture statement before 113th Congress. 
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networks with friendly networks across cultures … [to] continue to 
develop our global SOF network. Investing in our network allows us to 
share the burden more appropriately. … Success in meeting these 
challenges demands unprecedented levels of trust, confidence, and 
understanding built through persistent engagement.19 
2. Building the Network 
The network’s evolution started with General Stanley McChrystal and Admiral 
McRaven’s experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, where both commanders had seen the 
utility of networking within the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) organization. 
The idea of a globally networked SOF started to come to life on or about 2009. First the 
U.S. SOF community began connecting internally and with its interagency community to 
build a holistic approach to the new threats.20 Once the internal U.S. community had 
started connecting, its next step was to start connecting with international allies and 
partners to make this a global network.  
The theme for the 3rd International Special Operations Forces (ISOF) Conference 
in 2012 was “Building the Global SOF Network.” In 2013, Joint Special Operations 
University (JSOU) together with Canadian Special Operations Forces Command 
(CANSOFCOM) Professional Development Center (PDC) hosted a symposium in 
Tampa, Florida, with the theme “The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource 
Constrained Environment.”21 The symposium included SOF personnel from Canada, the 
United States, and eight other countries. One theme that emerged early in the symposium 
and persisted throughout the sessions was the need to sustain and adapt existing mission-
essential networks, while continuing to develop new ones during times of austerity.22 The 
participants acknowledged that the realities of new and changing mission sets and 
declining resources called for critical thinking and innovation in order to deliver 
operational success and sustain the advances achieved over the past decade-plus of war. 
                                                 
19 General Joseph L. Votel, Congressional testimony, July 2014; cited in USSOCOM, 
“Operationalizing the Global SOF Network,” (J3I-Brief, September 15, 2014). Italics in original. 
20 Stanley A. McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2013). 
21 Ricks, Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment, ix.  
22 Ricks, Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment, 2. 
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In May 2014, USSOCOM hosted the fourth ISOF Conference with participating 
SOF leaders from more than 80 countries. The conference theme, “Strengthening the 
Global SOF Network,” surfaced a new issue not explored in any depth in any previous 
conferences. USSOCOM’s network strategy, which emphasizes a comprehensive whole-
of-government approach to coordinate agencies, departments, and partner SOF, did not 
fully explain how small nations like Sweden and Norway, as Global SOF Network 
members, were expected to contribute to and benefit from the Network.23 The NATO 
SOF structure and communication network has enhanced the SOF capacity and 
interoperability amongst its members in the last decade, of which Norwegian Special 
Operations Forces (NORSOF) and Sweden’s Special Operations Forces (SWESOF) are 
contributing members.24 How does USSOCOM’s global network initiative impact these 
relatively small SOF communities and their relationships in other security alliances?25 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
USSOCOM’s response to the new threat environment suggests networked forces 
conducting global long-term preventive actions within a whole-of-government approach. 
The austere situation requires the United States to focus on low footprint solutions. 
USSOCOM has touched upon the need for burden sharing among the expeditionary-
capable SOF nations to be able to face the global threat networks.  
Sweden and Norway are already active members of the NATO SOF network, and 
fill staff positions in the NATO SOF Headquarters. Further, these nations have liaison 
officers at USSOCOM in Tampa, which makes them also part of the newly established 
Global SOF Network.26 But, beyond the charm of novelty, Sweden and Norway have to 
ascertain how they can utilize, benefit from, and contribute to the GSN.  
                                                 
23 USSOCOM, Global SOF Network, White Paper, Tampa, Florida. April 22, 2013, 5. 
24 Jim Thomas and Chris Dougherty, Beyond the Ramparts: The Future of U.S. Special Operations 
Forces (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment (CSBA), 2013), 86. 
25 A symposium touching on these questions has been conducted. See the JSOU report edited by 
Chuck Ricks, The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment, 6‒9. 
26 Ewa Stenberg. “Sveriges hemliga krig” [Swedish Secret War], Dagens Nyheter [Today´s News], 
published January 25, 2014. http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/sveriges-hemliga-krig/. 
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Creating partnerships and building trust enhances the potential to gain support 
when needed. However, being a contributing and active partner in the network may 
require expanding roles and missions for the national SOF, reallocating resources, 
generating political will, and strengthening interagency and inter-department cooperation 
within Norway and Sweden.  
This leads to a key question: How can NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM contribute 
to and utilize the Global SOF Network to enhance SOF collaboration as a way to 
respond to the 21st century threats? 
C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The overall purpose of this project is to introduce Swedish and Norwegian 
decision-makers (political and military) to the GSN concept as a potential new 
framework for SOF cooperation. The scope is limited to the respective SOF Commands 
of Norway and Sweden. The range of the research includes a network analysis of the 
GSN, followed by a descriptive analysis of NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM’s 
management of their GSN membership. Also included is an analysis of NORSOCOM 
and SWESOCOM’s leadership role in a potential national SOF network.  
A motivating factor for the project was that the GSN concept potentially could 
provide Norway and Sweden new avenues to contribute to international collaboration in 
countering the 21st century threats.27 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The following methods are used in the project: Archival Research; Discussions; 
and Relational Analysis. 
                                                 
27 For SOF as an integrator of interagency efforts, see Michael E. Gates, “Creating SOF Networks: 
The Role of NATO Special Operations as a Testing Ground for SOF Integration” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, June 2011), abstract, 16, 20‒24. For SOF as optimal for long-term preventive indirect 
actions and “Phase Zero” operations, see Ricks, “General Themes and Thoughts,” in The Role of the Global 
SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment, 74‒75.  
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1. Archival Research 
USSOCOM’s official documents and other relevant literature (news articles and 
periodicals) are the sources from which we have gathered the data on the GSN. Most of 
the official USSOCOM documents have come from USSOCOM. Various articles have 
been identified through Internet searches, suggestions from colleagues and advisors, and 
through the different courses at NPS. 
2. Discussions 
Discussions with key USSOCOM personnel complement the archival data.28 The 
purpose of the discussions has been to confirm and clarify the archival data, and to 
retrieve additional data on the GSN. Discussions with Norwegian and Swedish SOF 
personnel have been conducted to confirm the authors’ understanding of the national 
context in relation to the GSN. The information gathering has employed an unstructured 
and informal approach during the discussions.29  
The second purpose of the discussions with USSOCOM personnel has been to 
probe the Command’s expectations for countries like Norway and Sweden. What is 
expected, or at least desired, from USSOCOM’s perspective, from these nations 
concerning information sharing, burden sharing, and interagency effort? 
3. Relational Analysis of the Overall GSN 
Relational analysis is the third method utilized in this study. We first developed a 
sociogram, based on the archival research and the discussions with key stakeholders, to 
present a visual overview of the network, its participants, types of connections, and the 
network´s structure. We then described the network´s topography, coordination 
infrastructure, governance and leadership, roles, tasks, processes, and style. The 
                                                 
28 The authors participated during the International SOF Conference in Tampa, May 19‒22, 2014. 
Several discussions were conducted with USSOCOM leaders, staffers, and NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM commanders. On July 8, 2014, the authors conducted a VTC discussion with then 
Commander USSOCOM, Admiral McRaven. 
29 Louis Cohen, Lawrence Manion, and Keith Morrison, Research Methods in Education, 7th ed. 
(New York: Routledge, 2011), 412‒413. Unstructured and informal conversation approach: Questions 
emerge from the immediate context and are asked in the natural course of things; there is no 
predetermination of question topics or wording. 
 10
descriptive section is the foundation for a following segment where the GSN is placed on 
Roberts’ Design Continuum in order to develop an understanding of the network as a 
whole. 
E. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The project has not covered all aspects of the GSN effort. Even if the authors have 
analyzed available documents and writings about the GSN, and discussed with GSN 
architects, USSOCOM leadership, as well as the commanders of NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM and their Liaison officers (LOs) at USSOCOM, there are probably 
challenges, benefits and potential recommendations that are not covered in this project. 
This is not because they are less important or relevant. Time for data collection including 
time available to conduct discussions with involved personnel was limited. Further, social 
networks are complicated and there are unique details in each case that the research has 
not been able to identify completely, either due to lack of time, limited access to 
information, or lack of knowledge and understanding of the situation at hand. 
F. THE CAPSTONE PROJECT STRUCTURE 
Chapter I describes the future threat environment and USSOCOM’s strategic 
response as exemplified in the GSN. We then define the problem—the need for improved 
knowledge about the GSN in Norway and Sweden in order to contribute to the GSN. 
Chapter II opens with a description of social networks, their evolution, design, 
and relevant factors when analyzing performance. It then lays out the theoretical 
framework for the analyses conducted throughout the project. 
Chapter III is reliant on archival data and discussions with network members. 
This chapter describes and analyzes the GSN. In particular, it details the development and 
performance of the network, its “fit” with the environment, its design tensions, and its 
overall assessment of strength and weaknesses. Chapter III provides an understanding of 
the GSN in particular. 
Chapter IV describes implications for NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM’s 
contribution to and utilization of the GSN. The first part describes the challenges for 
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NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM when managing their GSN membership in the whole 
network. The second part describes NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM’s internal 
management challenges when leading a national SOF network. 
Chapter V summarizes the capstone project and offers our conclusions and 
recommendations. The chapter provides the main recommendations to NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM on how to manage their GSN membership as well as how to manage a 
potential national SOF network. Further, based on the analysis of the GSN in Chapter III, 
the project puts forward a few recommendations to USSOCOM on how to continue and 
enhance the evolution of the GSN into the near future.  
To effectively contribute to the network as well as share the benefits of 
membership, Norway and Sweden need to understand the structure and critical aspects of 
networks in general and the GSN in particular. The next chapter provides the necessary 
framework of social network theory: What is a network? What is a social network? What 
is network design? How does one assess and analyze a network?  
 12
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II. SOCIAL NETWORKS  
This chapter creates the theoretical framework for the analysis that follows in 
Chapter III and Chapter IV. The framework described in this chapter will give the reader 
a basic understanding of social networks and how we can design and analyze them to 
improve their performance. 
A. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF SOCIAL NETWORKS 
Networks are not a new phenomenon either in the civilian business environment 
or the military. Small networks have always existed—networks of family, friends, clubs, 
and co-workers. According to the network theorist Patti Anklam, 
We all use our networks every day. From the simplest transaction with a 
colleague to participating in complex multinational agreements, we are in 
webs of relationships that we tap into in order to accomplish something 
that we could not do by ourselves.30  
However, today our growing interconnections and global reach are pushing us 
toward networks of increasing size and complexity. We are being challenged to 
understand large-scale networks and how to function and operate effectively within them. 
Although we have developed the social network analysis tools and methodology to 
analyze social networks, we still lack the basic understanding of social networks, how 
they are created and designed, how they are managed, and most importantly, how we 
conduct our “net work,” within them.31 
1. What Is a Social Network? 
Social networks are made up of connections and relationships between humans. 
As Professor Nancy Roberts defines the term, a network is “two or more nodes that have 
                                                 
30 Patti Anklam, Net Work: A Practical Guide to Creating and Sustaining Networks at Work and in the 
World (Amsterdam; Boston: Elsevier/Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007), xi. 
31 Anklam, Net Work, 1‒2. 
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a sustained connection over time.”32 A node can be a person, group, organization, nation, 
etc., and exists inside the boundaries of a network.  
Network connections or ties are the relationships between the human nodes that 
connect them. There can be different types of connections within social networks. For 
example, a network might have sub-networks of authority ties, information ties, advice 
ties, and trust ties. Each of these sub-networks (e.g., authority, information sharing, 
advice, and trust) when combined represents the network as a whole. For example, in a 
military organization authority ties represent the chain of command, but there are many 
other connections that unite military personnel. 
2. Principles of Social Networks 
There are many reasons for the turn towards networks: the constant and rapid 
change in the environment that favors quick and adaptive forms of organizing; the 
communication and information revolution; the desire to be more connected with 
stakeholders; and the desire to collaborate with others.  
Patti Anklam puts forward eight fundamental principles to understand a network; 







                                                 
32 Professor Nancy Roberts, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2014. Lecture in the 
network design course. 
33 Compiled from Anklam, Net Work, 4‒7. 
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34 Anklam, Net Work, 4‒7. 
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3. Level of Analysis 
When studying and analyzing a social network it is important to be clear on what 
level of analysis is used. If the analysis is conducted at the individual level, it examines 
the network of person-to-person relationships. If the analysis is conducted at the group 
level, it examines the network of inter-group relationships. If the analysis is conducted at 
the organizational level, it examines the network of inter-organizational relationships, and 
so on. This project examines relations among the organizations participating in the GSN. 
The term inter-organizational network has many different interpretations. Most 
note that they consist of multiple organizations that are legally autonomous, with 
connections based on cooperation and collaboration.35 To define inter-organizational 
networks, the authors have used Professor Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr.’s definition of inter-
organizational networks: 
Networks are structures of interdependence involving multiple 
organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal 
subordinate of the others in some larger hierarchical arrangement. 
Networks exhibit some structural stability by extending beyond formally 
established linkages and policy legitimated ties…. The institutional glue 
congealing networked ties may include authority bonds, exchange 
relations, and coalitions based on common interest, all within a single 
multi-unit structure.36 
Within an inter-organizational network, one of the goals is to increase the social 
capital, social capital is 
[t]he stock of active connections among people; the trust, mutual 
understanding and shared values and behaviors that bind the members of 
human networks and communities and make cooperative action possible.37  
The nodes in an inter-organizational network fill the function of bonding social 
capital within an organization, and/or bridging social capital between organizations. 
Social capital is created by making the skills, knowledge, and experience available to 
                                                 
35 H. Brinton Milward and Keith G. Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative 
Networks (Washington, DC: IBM Center for The Business of Government, 2006). 
36 Milward and Provan, A Manager´s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks, 9. 
37 Anklam, Net Work, 15. 
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anyone in the network at the point of need. The benefits of a networked organization then 
are the rapid access to information, knowledge, and experience when solving difficult 
tasks.38 As Anklam notes, it is expected that understanding and using a networked 
approach could improve the organizations’ resiliency, credibility, reach, diffusion of 
knowledge and innovation, collective intelligence, and individual and network 
performance.39 
4. The Evolution of Social Networks 
A network results from a conversation among individuals, groups, or 
organizations that see the potential for uniting in a common purpose to create value.40 A 
network is created either by intent or through discovery. A network created by intent 
means that one or more constituents who have a clear purpose in mind create it 
intentionally. A network created through discovery means that the potential for a network 
is discovered when a shared interest or concern surfaces in a conversation.41 Figure 2 
shows Anklam’s depiction of how a network is created and evolves over time. 
 
Figure 2.  A network’s evolution.42 
                                                 
38 Anklam, Net Work, 25. 
39 Ibid., 26. 
40 Ibid., 132. 
41 Ibid., 132. 
42 The authors have changed the term Design phase to Organize phase to distinguish the phase from 
the overall network design as a whole. Anklam, Net Work, 133.  
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When the shared interest or common purpose has been identified, the network 
transitions into its Organize phase. During this phase, the activities are focused on 
establishing the network’s purpose, identifying stakeholders, and initiating or 
strengthening relationships. Organizational tasks including establishing structure, style 
and a governance model, establishing norms for participation and defining the networks 
boundaries will have to be initiated in this phase as well.  
During the Growth phase, the network continues building its capabilities, 
including structural, human, and relational capital, create new connections, and enhance 
its tensile strength as members work together toward the network´s purpose.43 
During the Performance phase, the network maintains its momentum as members 
interact in value producing activities and conversations. The members are communicating 
across the network, managing problems, and responding to new possibilities and 
opportunities as they arise.44 
These stages, especially the Growth phase, do not proceed in a linear pattern. 
There are setbacks and disruptions from both external and internal elements, as well as 
internal struggles and challenges that occur naturally over time. As depicted in Figure 2, 
the network will constantly have to examine how it is evolving and, if necessary, make 
changes to ensure that the network is performing well. 
B. DESIGNING SOCIAL NETWORKS 
As an organizing form, networks will never replace hierarchical structures or 
markets, but it is now clear that network forms (which vary) offer a range of choices for 
managing people, ideas, and work that were not previously available.45 Depending on 
their purpose and tasks networks will have different designs. So to be able to understand 
the network and its elements it is important to understand the environment the network is 
operating in and how this influences the network and its performance. As stated by 
                                                 




Anklam, the design of a network is one discussion point among the network’s creators, 
organizers, developers, and stakeholders throughout the life of the network.46 
1. Definition of Network Design 
Professor Nancy Roberts proposes the following definition for network design: 
Network design is a constellation of a network’s elements (e.g., its 
membership, purpose, interactions, structure, governance, etc.), which in 
combination describe the network as a whole.47 
Designing a successful network requires that the constituents look for attractors 
that will draw people to the network; that they set boundaries for it; and design structures, 
events, and activities that they believe will forward the work of the network based on 
their knowledge and understanding of what brings people together. What needs to be 
reconciled is how to create networks in a way that acknowledges this complex property 
of emergence but also satisfies the need to provide direction and coherence.48 
2. Components/Elements of Network Design 
The following design aspects are important to consider when designing a 
network: Purpose, Structure, Topography, Governance, Leadership, and Style/Culture. 
The Purpose is what prompts its members to care about the network and make 
them want to contribute to the network. The Structure is the network’s “wiring diagram,” 
the form and pattern of its connections among its nodes. Topography is the sum of all ties 
within the network. This gives insight into the resilience of the network. The topography 
gives the network its strength and weaknesses. Governance is the fine art and delicate 
practice of guiding and steering a network in a steady operational state. It is the function 
that keeps the network in balance and relationships intact. Leadership is the function that 
makes sure that the network is performing towards its purpose by creating and 
                                                 
46 Anklam, Net Work, 141. 
47 Nancy Roberts, “Network Structure” (PowerPoint presentation, Network Design course, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2014).  
48 Anklam, Net Work, 160. 
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maintaining the conditions that enable relationships. The Style shows the nature of the 
network’s interactions, its social climate, its culture, its core values, and norms. 
a. Network Purpose 
According to the authors Brinton Milward and Kevin Provan, “In order to know 
how to manage networks or to manage an organization operating within a network 
context, network managers must first understand the purpose of the network.”49 Anklam 
concurs in her Principle #2: Every network has an underlying purpose, and every 
network creates value (see Table 1). 
The network’s purpose statement or mission statement enables the network and its 
leadership to keep the network on track and ensure it is moving towards its proclaimed 
purpose. 
Anklam notes that networks fulfill multiple purposes and she classifies them into 
five broad categories; Mission, Business, Idea, Learning, and Personal, as shown in 
Figure 3. It is important to note that a network can have more than one of these network 
purposes, for example, a combination of Mission, Idea, and Learning. 
 
Figure 3.  Main types of network purposes.50 
                                                 
49 Milward and Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks, 10. 
50 Anklam, Net Work, 31. 
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The shared purpose is one of the most important factors to enhance network 
collaboration. It is possible to have a network without clearly stated shared interest; 
however, network members need to be aware that divergent views on a network’s 
purpose can create design tensions among network members (see the following 
discussion). 
b. Network Structure 
As Anklam has written, “The underlying structural pattern of a network is the 
most tangible of a network’s properties: it is the aspect of the network that you can draw 
or visualize.”51 This statement relates back to Anklam’s Principle #1: If it’s a network, 
you can draw it (see Table 1).  
One key aspect of social networks has been the identification of a distinct set of 
patterns that recur, and an understanding of how these patterns evolve over time, and 
insights into how a network’s pattern predicts its performance. Figure 4 shows examples 
of the most common network structures. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Main types of network structures.52 
                                                 
51 Anklam, Net Work, 51. 
52 Anklam, Net Work, 53‒67. 
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 Hierarchy is a network that propagates authority from a single person at 
the “top” through a structured series of subgroups. A common structure 
within government organizations. 
 Mesh, also called heterarchy, is a network in which all members are 
equally connected to everyone else. A common structure within highly 
innovative focused, closed-knit teams in organizations. 
 Hub-and-Spoke is a network where all the members are connected to one 
central hub. Typically, the hub holds the purpose of the network and sets 
the style. 
 Cluster is usually a larger network that shows patterns of either connected 
or isolated groupings, or clusters, of nodes. This can reflect small groups 
of people who work together in the same geographic area. A common 
structure within a global cooperation that has offices around the world. 
 Core/Periphery is a network with a “core,” which is often a small number 
of people well known to each other, usually surrounded by a larger set of 
people on the periphery. A core set of people forms a hub, from which 
they connect to others. 
 Federated is a network that has become a common structure when the 
network is spread geographically. The core network serves as the hub of 
multiple, relative autonomous hubs. 
A network structure may look solid, hard-wired, and “objective.” It is not. The 
structure is fluid and emergent, and its shapes are likely to change over time.53 
As the environment and people change so will the network structures. 
Understanding how different structures are more or less suitable for different types of 
work is also important. For example, a hierarchical structure is less suitable in an 
environment focusing on innovation and creativity. Thus, there is no right structure for a 
network. Network structures are aligned with the environment, the type of work the 
network is doing, and the network´s purpose among other elements. 
c. Multiple Structures 
A key question in understanding social networks is to decide what relationships 
are important for the analysis. For example, trust, friendship, reporting, and information 
are all examples of different relationship types that can exist in a network. This means 
that relationship can create its own sub-structure. Together, these  “sub structures” then 
form the “whole network structure.” In other words, a network can have multiple sub-
                                                 
53 Roberts, “Network Structure.”  
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networks with different structures and merged together these sub structures will produce 
a different overall structure for the whole network. One reason for conducting network 
analysis is to examine these relational patterns to illuminate how the network “really” 
works, such as finding informal hubs--the people whom others go to for information or 
who are best at communicating across boundaries in an organization.54 
d. Network Topography/Texture 
The people in a network are connected through ties that describe the nature of 
their relationships. From a structural standpoint, the sum of the ties—of any type—in a 
network gives it topography or texture.55 There are many metrics related to the analysis 
of a network’s topography. Four are most widely used: density, distance, centrality, and 
open or closed.56 
 Density is the tightness of the structure. If everyone in the network were 
connected to everyone else, the network would have a density of 100 
percent. The denser the network the greater resilience it will have. Density 
can also be correlated with the effectiveness of the network. 
 Distance is a measure of how many people a piece of information needs to 
go through to get to everyone in the network. This is also called the 
“degrees of separation.” This metric gives an indication of how quickly 
information can spread out across the network to reach all members. It 
also indicates how easy it is for any individual to reach the person who 
may be able to solve a specific problem. 
 Centrality is a measure of how dependent a network is on one or two 
people or organizations. 
 Open or closed is a measure of the balance within the network between 
external ties (those ties that people in the network go to for interaction 
outside of the network) and the internal ties (those ties among people 
within the network). 
The topography of a network also can demonstrate the network’s tensile strength, 
which is a network’s ability to withstand stress and change without breaking down. The 
topography of the network depends largely on how easily ties are created, and the 
strength of the connections. It is also evidence of the mixture of strong and weak ties. 
                                                 
54 Anklam, Net Work, 55. 
55 Ibid., 71. 
56 Anklam, Net Work, 72. 
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Strong ties are those between people who have known each other for a long time. Weak 
ties are ties that are not active, not used very much, or not shared by others in the 
network.57 
e. Network Governance 
All networks have some form of governance, explicit or assumed, which use a 
variety of levers to keep the network in balance and relationships intact. Governance is 
the fine art and delicate practice of guiding and steering a network in a steady operational 
state. It has to be flexible, attuned to the environment, and capable of change.58 Anklam 
states that it is important, therefore, not to think of a governance model as an end-state 
but as an expression of increasing levels of coherence.59  
Milward and Provan point out that inter-organizational networks have both 
network- and organization-level implications. Network-level managers have a major 
responsibility to ensure that all organizations that participate in a network are responsible 
for their share of network activities and are held accountable for their actions relative to 
the network-level purpose.60 As Managers of Networks, their responsibilities are to 
coordinate overall network activities and ensure the successes of the network as a whole 
(see Table 2 which follows and Figure 16 in Chapter IV).61 
Managers in Networks, in contrast, are individuals who represent their 
organization within the network. Their primary loyalty is to their organization, but they 
must work within a network context managing both the organization-level and network-
level objectives to protect against split missions and split loyalties (see Table 2 which 
follows and Figure 16 in Chapter IV).62 
                                                 
57 Anklam, Net Work, 72.  
58 Anklam, Net Work, 59. 
59 Ibid., 59. 
60 Milward and Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks. 
61 Ibid., 18. 
62 Ibid., 18. 
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Milward and Provan’s concept of network management tasks (Table 2) is used as 
the analytical framework for describing the challenges for NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM as both Managers of Networks and Managers in Networks in Chapter IV.  
Table 2.   Management tasks in networks.63 
 
                                                 
63 Milward and Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks, 19. 
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Because networks are complex entities there is no one governance structure that 
fits all. The governance structure has to be aligned with the particular context of the 
network. The authors, Keith G. Provan and Patrick Kenis have identified three basic 
forms of network governance structures in inter-organizational networks: self-
governance, lead-organization governance, and network administrative organization 
(NAO) governance (see Table 3 and Figure 5). 
The most common form, self-governance, requires all network members to be 
active network managers. This form tends to be used when few organizations form a 
network. When more network members are involved, self-governance becomes too 
difficult, and they move toward more centralized network design, either with a lead 
organization form or a network administrative structure. The NAO structure means that 
member organizations of the network create a specific organization whose task is to 
manage the network as a whole.64 Table 3 and Figure 5 provide a good overall 
explanation of the three structures and their differences. 
Table 3.   Network governance structures.65 
 
 
                                                 
64 Keith G. Provan and Patrick Kenis (2005) are cited in Milward and Provan, A Manager´s Guide to 
Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks, 7, 21‒24.  
65 Milward and Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks, 22. 
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Figure 5.  Network governance structures.66 
Provan and Kenis’ concept of inter-organizational network governance structures 
(Table 3 and Figure 5) is used to identify the three options for defining USSOCOM’s 
leadership role within the GSN in Chapter III and for suggesting NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM’s leadership role within the national SOF network in Chapter IV. 
How the network identifies and accepts new members is another critical task for 
the network governance. There are three basic membership structures: open, criteria-
based, and invitation-only.67 
 Open networks are completely open for anyone to join. These networks 
trust that only people who have a serious intent on sharing the network’s 
purpose will become participating members. 
 Criteria-based networks require specific certifications, degrees, 
associations, resident with a particular area, or require members to sign 
agreements to become members. 
 Invitation-only networks might suggest the close exclusionary bias of a 
country club. The members have to be invited to become members. 
                                                 
66 Milward and Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks, 23. 
67 Anklam, Net Work, 69. 
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In the 21st century, successful businesses and government organizations are 
attuned to the need to partner throughout their valued network. But the most important 
step after the network has figured out its purpose is to identify the right partners that can 
provide the resources that the network needs.68 
f. Network Leadership 
The work of network leaders is primarily to create and maintain the conditions 
that enable relationships. This statement relates back to Anklam’s sixth principle:  
Principle #6: A leader’s work is to create and maintain the conditions that enable 
productive and innovative relationships (Table 1).  
Leaders convene diverse people and groups to identify common interests, build 
social capital with emphasis on trust and reciprocity, engage network members in a 
shared vision, manage conflict, generate cooperation, and build consensus through 
dialogue. Tim DeMello, founder and CEO of Ziggs, Inc., says the role of a leader is to 
make employees start to think in terms of their networks, to begin each day and each new 
task by thinking about their entire co-working network.69 
The leadership element has to focus on integrating all the elements of interaction, 
orientation, locus, and culture to ensure that the members of the network can work in 
harmony. One aspect of the uniqueness of network is that everyone in a network can 
influence the relationships in the network, and thereby the outcomes of the network, as 
stated in Anklam’s fifth principle (Table 1). 
g. Network Style/Culture 
Network style points back to Anklam’s third principle. Principle #3: Once we 
learn to distinguish and identify the unique and individual characteristics of networks we 
can create, examine, and shape their properties, boundaries, and environment. To 
characterize a network by its style means looking at five key factors that contributes to 
the network’s uniqueness. These are locus, culture, interactions, orientation, and 
                                                 
68 Anklam, Net Work, 70. 
69 Ibid, 226. 
 29
leadership (described previously), which all have a key role to play in the design of a 
network.70  
(1) Locus 
Locus is where the network “lives”; its dimensions are place, space, and pace. For 
networks that meet and interact face-to-face the locus is a real physical place. For virtual 
networks the “place” can be cyberspace. All networks need an information space. It 
would be rare to find a network that does not have a virtual presence of some kind in an 
information system somewhere. A website can reflect the purpose, structure, and style of 
the network. The pace of a network comprises both rhythm and momentum, balancing 
connections in both place and space. The rhythm is what enables members to 
synchronize. When a network is not actively engaged in a project, it needs to have some 
regular pace of communication so that its membership continues to identify with it. 
(2) Culture 
Culture is the overall tone of the network. Cultural factors that set the tone for 
how the network is experienced include identity, core values, and norms. These all lead 
to and enhance the social capital of the network. All networks have an identity that it 
shares with all its members and often it is the basis for membership in the network. The 
network’s core values are (or should be) part of the network’s purpose statement, which 
reflects the common beliefs of the members. Key values that are common to successful 
networks are openness, diversity,71 and transparency. The cultural norms consist of 
expectations about how people will behave in various situations. The specific norms that 
are foundational to a network are commitment to the collective, reciprocity, and trust. 
However, violation of trust—or any of the network’s norms—can be managed well only 
in an environment rich in social capital. Social capital is the sum of the bonds among 
                                                 
70 Anklam, Net Work, 81‒116. 
71 However, other research suggests significantly lower trust in culturally heterogeneous teams, 
indicating that diversity can make it more difficult to build trust in a network with great cultural 
differences. Bjørnstad points to a need to allocate time to build trust in culturally diverse teams. Anne Lise 
Bjørnstad, “Network Organization Pitfalls and Success Factors for Team and Organizational Processes: 
Analyses of Key Organizational Variables and Cultural Differences in International Contexts.” University 
of Oslo, PhD diss. submitted to the Faculty of Social Sciences and Department of Psychology. February 
2012. 
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people in a network and the behaviors that are expected, allowed, and enabled by how 
people meet, greet, interact with, and otherwise express their shared identity with others. 
(3) Interactions 
Interactions are the way the network exchanges information both internally and 
externally. The three primary modes of interactions are transactional, knowledge-based, 
and personal or relational. The style of a network—and its ability to accomplish its 
purpose—is shown not just in the extent to which interactions of one kind or another 
predominate, but also in the ability of its members to know which style of interaction to 
use at what time. 
(4) Orientation 
Orientation of the network has to be aligned with the network’s work. A network 
focused on outcomes designs its infrastructure, place, space, and pace toward production. 
But a network focused on discovery and learning might design its infrastructure and 
culture differently. It’s not a matter of a “right” orientation, but rather a matter of making 
that orientation visible so the network can decide if it’s balanced appropriately for its 
purpose. 
C. ASSESSING NETWORK PERFORMANCE 
Kenis and Provan established three exogenous performance factors: The form of 
network´s governance, whether the network is mandatory or voluntary, and the 
developmental stage of the network.  
The governance form has consequences for what the network can actually achieve 
(see Table 3 and Figure 5). None of these governance structures is universally superior. 
Rather each differs in what it can do well. Shared governance has the strength of 
inclusion and involvement of its members and its flexibility towards its members’ needs. 
A weakness is its relative inefficiency. Lead organization governance has the strength of 
efficiency and the inherent legitimacy provided by the lead agency. A potential weakness 
is the lead organization’s own agenda and dominance of other members, which causes 
resistance. Network administrative governance has the strength of sustainability, 
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legitimacy, and to a lesser degree, its efficiency. Potential weaknesses are that network 
members may rely too heavily on the governance organization, making decision-making 
processes overly bureaucratic.72  
Mandated versus voluntary inception of the network also will affect which type of 
performance criteria is most appropriate for use. Van Raaij’s research shows a clear 
variation in the type of outcomes that can realistically be attained by the different types of 
inception. In contrast, regardless of inception type, Kenis and Provan argue that a 
network needs a common foundation of norms in order to achieve network-level 
outcomes such as a positive network climate, network legitimacy, and activating 
capacity.73  
The developmental stage of the network is expected to affect the choice of 
performance criteria at various times during a network’s life cycle. For example, it is 
clear that newly emergent networks have problems with goal attainment, while mature 
networks should be expected to attain network-level goals and be relatively efficient. 
During an early growth phase, networks should be expected to develop legitimacy, but 
not necessarily to be legitimate.74 
This next section describes two tools to analyze a network, identify its tensions, 
and recommend solutions to enhance the network’s performance to fulfill its main 
purpose. The two methods are the Systems Framework tool, and the Network Design 
Continuum tool, which are used in the analysis of the GSN in Chapter III.75 
                                                 
72 Patrick Kenis and Keith G. Provan, “Towards an Exogenous Theory of Public Network 
Performance,” Public Administration 87, no. 3 (2009), 444‒449. 
73 Ibid., 449‒450. 
74 Ibid., 451. 
75 Both tools described are from Professor Nancy Roberts, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California, 2014. 
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1. Systems Framework Tool 
The Systems Framework is a diagnostic tool to describe a network or an 
organization to identify areas for improvement. Figure 6 shows the systems framework 
tool with all its elements. 
 
Figure 6.  Systems framework diagnostics tool.76 
                                                 
76 Nancy Roberts, “Systems Framework Diagnostics Tool” (PowerPoint presentation, Network Design 
course, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2014). 
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The systems framework tool is a comprehensive and systematic way of analyzing 
a network to identify where the network has difficulties that may interfere with its 
performance. The tool is split up into three parts: Inputs, Throughput, and Result. The 
inputs represent influence factors from the external environment and the guidance and 
directions given to the network from its leadership. Throughput identifies the design 
factors, or the internal elements of the network, which includes structure, style, and 
value. It describes how the members interact and cooperate within the network. Culture, 
for example, is manifested in people’s behavior, conflict management, and informal 
patterns of interaction. Culture identifies the underlying health of the network, the 
informal structures, and what is the network’s informal power. This element is made a 
separate element because it affects all three elements and is relative difficult to 
understand and change. Results are what the network achieves. This can be both positive 
and negative, and it can be both intended or unintended outputs and outcomes. Outputs 
are the direct results of an action, while outcomes are the more long-term results of the 
outputs. 
One way to use this tool is to start by looking at what outputs and outcomes the 
network is producing and then go back and see if that matches the network’s purpose. If 
there is a mismatch between the network’s stated purpose and the actual performance 
then the next step is to ascertain where the problems lie—in the assessment of the 
environment, the system direction, the design elements, or the measurement of its results, 
or in the fit among all the elements that form the whole network.  
2. Network Design Continuum Tool 
The Network Design Continuum is a tool to describe a network in terms of its 
four different dimensions: Unbounded to Bounded Membership, Informal to Formal 
Interactions, Heterarchical to Hierarchical Coordination, and Shared to Centralized 
Governance/Decision making. When placing the network on these four dimensions, a 
judgment can be made of where the network lies on the continuum that ranges from 
Anarchic Networks to Organized Networks. Figure 7 gives an example of the network 
design continuum tool. 
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Figure 7.  The design continuum analysis tool.77 
Roberts’ definition of the four dimensions:78 
 Unbounded to Bounded Membership Dimension 
 Unbounded networks have no limitations on membership. 
 Bounded networks limit participation and membership based on location 
or shared purpose or identity. 
 Informal to Formal Relations Dimension 
 Informal networks are spontaneous, ad hoc, with voluntary interactions 
that emerge organically. They lack role definitions, codified purposes, and 
rules to govern network interaction, are built on personal relationships and 
self-organization. 
                                                 
77 Nancy Roberts, “Design Continuum Analysis Tool” (PowerPoint presentation, Network Design 
course, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2014). 
78 Ibid. 
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 Formal networks have a purpose or goal that guides collective action. 
They are production networks, and have specified roles, tasks, processes, 
and procedures that constrain interactions. 
 Heterarchical to Hierarchical Coordination Dimension 
 Heterarchical networks form structural patterns where each node connects 
with other nodes to coordinate and integrate activity. 
 Hierarchical networks form structural patterns where one node coordinates 
and integrates all nodes in the network 
 Shared to Centralized Governance Dimension 
 Shared governance networks have co-equal nodes that assume collective 
responsibility for decision-making. It is “pluralistic governance.” 
Outcomes are generated without reference to centralized authority. 
 Centralized governance networks have one node that assumes 
responsibility and authority for network decision making. It is “unicentrix 
governance.” 
Two main configurations anchor the network design continuum: Anarchic 
Network and Organized Network. 
 Anarchic networks are voluntary with unbounded membership. This 
configuration will focus on informal interactions that rely on self-
organization and shared decision-making. 
 Organized networks have bounded membership. They have rule-
constrained interactions that rely on hierarchical coordination and 
centralized decision-making. 
A network design analysis should describe the whole network and its constituent 
elements. A configuration is composed of mutually supportive and interdependent 
features that “fit” together such that the presence of certain elements will vary 
consistently with the presence of others.79  
By locating a network on the network design continuum, the analyst may be able 
to ascertain how well the network elements fit together. For example, a hierarchical 
coordination structure may fit better with a network based on mainly formal relations. An 
example of poor fit may be the combination of shared governance in a network with 
hierarchical coordination. A poor fit would suggest a need to intervene to improve 
                                                 
79 Miller and Friesen (1984), Estimation of “Fit,” cited in Nancy Roberts, Network Design course, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2014. 
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network performance.80 For example, a well-organized network operating in a rapidly 
changing and dynamic environment might need to reorganize towards an agile, self-
organizing network. Alternatively, as networks increase in size and complexity, leaders 
typically move towards the organized end of the design continuum, as a way of being 
better able “to manage” the network. The movement towards the organized end of the 
design continuum might enhance the network effectiveness, but only if the network, its 
constituent parts, and its environment are a good fit with one another. 
3. Design Tensions 
All networks will have tensions as they respond to changes in the environment, 
changes in the demographics of their members, and changes in purpose, structure, or style 
of the network.81 For example, NATO, as a network of member nations has encountered 
internal tensions due to Russian actions related to Ukraine (change in the environment).82 
When a network principle or its underlying rules are broken, the network may go off 
course. It will need intervention of some kind to restore it either to the state from which it 
veered or to take it in another direction altogether, but with purpose.83  
During the phases of a network’s evolution, there are always tensions at play. It is 
important to understand that the network’s evolution has to be constantly monitored 
throughout its lifespan. Networks can experience many different types of tensions, for 
example, between what’s good for the network, that is, what supports both its purpose 
and its existence, and what’s good for the individual in the network.84 Both leaders and 
members need to be aware of how these tensions impact the network as a whole. 
Different design tensions are further discussed in the analysis of the GSN in 
Chapter III and in Chapter V. 
                                                 
80 Nancy Roberts, “A Conceptual Framework” (lecture, Network Design course, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California, 2014). 
81 Anklam, Net Work, 142. 
82 NSNBC International, “Will France and Germany Challenge NATO?” September 22, 2014, 
http://nsnbc.me/2014/09/22/will-france-germany-challenge-nato/. 
83 Anklam, Net Work, 161. 
84 Anklam, Net Work, 99. 
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D. SUMMARY 
Understanding social networks is a continuing process and demands some 
analysis throughout the life cycle of a network. Understanding the complex relationships 
between nodes within a network, and between the network and the external environment, 
are essential parts of making a network function and perform well. Roberts has put 
forward some guidance for practitioners when it comes to creating and designing 
networks. These are: 
 Understand that network design is a matter of choice. 
 Decide how you want to design your network and its elements, so that 
they are compatible with one another and the environment. 
 Decide where you want to position your network on the design continuum, 
and manage the network accordingly. 
 Understand that leadership and management vary depending on the 
network designs. 
 Be prepared to identify and manage design tensions during the network’s 
life cycle to secure network effectiveness and performance.85 
The theoretical framework given in this chapter is the basis for the next two 
chapters, which provide an analysis of the overall GSN and a descriptive analysis of 
challenges for NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM as managers in networks and managers 
of networks. The analysis will utilize the elements discussed in this chapter, using both 
the systems framework tool, and the design continuum tool to illuminate potential tension 
areas within the overall GSN, and between the GSN and the environment. 
                                                 
85 Roberts, “A Conceptual Framework.”  
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III. ANALYZING THE GLOBAL SOF NETWORK 
This chapter describes and analyzes the Global SOF Network with the overall 
purpose of deepening the understanding of the GSN from a network perspective among 
Norwegian and Swedish stakeholders. As an added bonus from this analysis, the paper 
also derives recommendations for USSOCOM on how to improve the overall GSN 
performance. The GSN’s performance, evolution, internal and external “fit,” design 
tensions, and strengths and weaknesses are analyzed through the lenses described in the 
previous chapter.86 The second part of this chapter will focus on the network’s initial 
performance, which includes an evaluation of the network’s current weaknesses and 
strengths. 
The United States and its allies have realized that no single nation can address the 
threats of the 21st century alone, and that there is rarely such a thing as a local problem. 
The globalized world is so interconnected that an incident in one place will have both 
second-and-third order effects in another place on the globe. 
The international SOF community has been engaging one another for decades, but 
during the last two years, USSOCOM has strengthened the SOF enterprise into a Global 
SOF Network.87 Currently, the GSN is in its early stages and still under development. 
Since 2012, USSOCOM has reinforced this network with communications infrastructure, 
stronger partnerships via liaisons officers (LOs) and a consistent battle rhythm.88 The 
potential long-term benefits include promoting shared interests, enhanced information 
sharing, and improved integration, interoperability, and interdependence with partner 
nations and the U.S. inter-agency partners.89 Ultimately the goal of this effort is to 
produce globally networked SOF—a cost-efficient, low footprint force capable of 
providing a persistent presence and rapid response to potential threats.  
                                                 
86 The analysis is conducted on the organizational level. 




A. DESCRIBING THE GLOBAL SOF NETWORK 
1. The Network Participants 
The GSN is an unbounded and open network where any nation can initiate contact 
with USSOCOM to become a member. The individual partner nation’s (PN) degree of 
participation depends on its needs, ambitions, and resources. Some of the PNs are 
members because they need and want support through the GSN membership, while 
others are members because they have the SOF capacity and a desire to share the burden 
within the network. The GSN started with USSOCOM internally connecting the U.S. 
SOF and with the U.S. interagency communities. The growth continued through 
connection of PN SOF. Today the GSN consists of multiple sub-networks that together 
create the overall network. The main sub-networks are: 
 The U.S. SOF network 
 The U.S. inter-agency network 
 The PN SOF network  
 The Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) and Functional Combatant 
Commands (FCC) network 
 The Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) network 
 NATO SOF network 
The list does not represent all the sub-networks of the GSN. However, these sub-
networks are the most prominent at the inter-organizational level. 
USSOCOM´s depiction of the GSN and its nodes is shown in Figure 8. The figure 
provides a generic picture of the overall network and the ties within the GSN, but a more 
detailed analysis of the network’s structure and design is needed.  
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Figure 8.  The Global SOF Network’s nodes and ties.90 
Figure 9 presents the authors’ interpretation of the GSN nodes and relationships. 
This network will be the basis for the analysis in this chapter. 
                                                 
90 USSOCOM, SOF 2020, Global SOF Network. 
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Figure 9.  Sociogram of the Global SOF Network structure. 
2. Purpose of the GSN 
USSOCOM introduced the Global SOF Network concept to enhance its already 
worldwide force by networking with U.S. interagency counterparts, foreign allies, and 
partners around the globe.91 One of the main drivers behind this approach was to link the 
SOF approach to the whole-of-government strategy, which would give the political 
leadership a holistic, small-footprint, and cost-effective tool to meet the threats of the 
21st century. 
                                                 
91 McRaven, Posture statement before the 113th Congress. 
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In the official USSOCOM documents the primary purpose of GSN is defined as:  
A globally networked force of SOF, Interagency, Allies, and Partners able 
to rapidly and persistently address regional contingencies and threats to 
stability.92 
The more specific purposes for the GSN as part of the U.S. global strategy are:93 
 To better support the GCC and TSOC with special operations forces and 
capabilities.  
 To gain expanded situational awareness of emerging threats and 
opportunities by enabling small, persistent presence in critical locations 
and facilitating engagement where necessary or appropriate. 
 To create a common picture of the global situation between the member 
nations to identify common interests and through that share the burden of 
action among the capable members.  
 To enhance the information sharing between the network members.94 
 To creating a forum where the various SOF communities can learn from 
each other and share lessons learned and tactics, technics, and procedures 
(TTPs).  
 To build mutual trust, foster enduring relationships, and provide new 
opportunities to effect shared challenges among the GSN members. 
Further, the development of J3-International at USSOCOM (discussed later in this 
chapter) facilitates opportunities for partner nations to identify common interests and 
build “coalitions of the willing” on specific issues. This function acknowledges the 
required processes among partner nations, for example, required UN mandate and 
parliamentary decisions before deployment of combat troops (see also Figure 12). 
In sum, it appears that the GSN is a combination of a mission, an idea, and a 
learning type network. The mission focus is on improvement of the local, national, 
regional, and global level. The idea focus is on generative thinking for innovation and 
                                                 
92 The Role of the Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment, JSOU Report. Ed. by 
Chuck Ricks, 2. 
93 McRaven, Posture statement before the 113th Congress. 
94 Information sharing and collaboration are the keys to building strong relationships with international 
partners and allies that assist in combating mutual threats and challenges. See USSOCOM, ISOF 
Conference 2014, Senior Leader Guide. 
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problem solving. The learning focus is on continuous improvement and enhancement of 
collective knowledge.95 
3. The Network Evolution 
The GSN was created intentionally by USSOCOM to address two major 
concerns:  
 With Afghanistan ending, there was a need to conserve all the partnerships 
that have been created during the last decade of warfighting. 
 Due to fiscal austerity and constraints the SOF community saw a need for 
a holistic, whole-of-government approach that focused on international 
collaboration and burden sharing.  
In terms of the network’s evolution, USSOCOM has focused on connecting the 
U.S. SOF community internally and connecting it with the inter-agencies to build a 
whole-of-government approach within the United States. At this initial stage, the U.S. 
stakeholders were identified and USSOCOM started working on the overall purpose for 
the network. The internal U.S. network became the basis for the continued evolution of 
the GSN. Figure 2 in Chapter II shows Anklam’s depiction of the different phases the 
network goes through during its network evolution. The figure also illustrates that a 
network must go back to adjust as the environment changes or it will not perform the way 
it was intended. 
During the growth phase, USSOCOM initially focused on the nations that already 
had LOs at either CENTCOM or USSOCOM and created what was known as the 
International Special Operations Coordination Center (ISCC) under USSOCOM to 
enhance the tensile strength among members while solidifying the network’s purpose.  
As the growth phase continued the ISCC transformed into the J3-I Division to 
better promote shared interests, enhance information sharing, and promote integration, 
interoperability and interdependence among PNs.96  
                                                 
95 Anklam, Net Work, 31. 
96 USSOCOM, ISOF Conference 2014, Senior Leader Guide. 
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Currently the GSN is still in its growth phase and has met some setbacks and 
disruptions during its rapid growth, mainly from the political level, but also from the 
conventional side of the U.S. military. These setbacks are exemplified by the Commander 
USSOUTHCOM’s rejection of USSOCOM’s plan for a Regional SOF Coordination 
Center (RSCC) in Colombia, and the House Armed Services Committee’s disapproval of 
USSOCOM’s request to establish a Washington office.97 In 2013, USSOCOM submitted 
the “Global Campaign Plan-Special Operations,” which currently is with the political 
leadership for approval. Figure 10 shows the main objectives for the campaign plan. 
 
Figure 10.  Global Campaign Plan-Special Operations main objectives.98 
Once this campaign plan is approved the GSN will be able to move from the 
growth phase and into the perform phase of its evolution. 
a. Ties and Types of Relationships 
The GSN consists of multiple sub-networks, which have different types of ties. 
The relationships range from simple information exchange to problem-solving 
                                                 
97 Paul McLeary, “Lawmakers Skeptical of Global Spec Ops Plan,” defencenews.com, August 10, 
2013. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130810/DEFREG02/308100007/Lawmakers-Skeptical-
Global-Spec-Ops-Plan 
98 USSOCOM, “Operationalizing the Global SOF Network,” (J3I-Brief). 
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collaboration to rich dialogue that raises ideas and insights. The main ties and 
relationships within the GSN are: 
 Authority ties within the U.S. SOF community (JCS-USSOCOM-TSOC-
SOCFWD-RSCC-SOLOs) 
 Reporting ties with the greater U.S. military community (USSOCOM-
GCC-FCC99) 
 Information sharing ties with the U.S. inter-agency (USSOCOM-IA-Dep) 
 Reporting ties with the NATO SOF Alliance (USSOCOM-NSHQ) 
 Information sharing ties with the partner nations (USSOCOM-PN 
SOCOM) 
Figure 9 illustrates type of ties and relationships with various types of lines. 
However, the figure does not show the strength of each tie that is to say which ties are 
strong or weak. Strong ties are between nodes that have an active connection and 
communicate often with each other. Within the GSN strong ties are found in the authority 
relationships within the U.S. SOF community. Weak ties are between the nodes that do 
not have an active connection and do not communicate often. Within the GSN, one 
example is with PN and the interagency where there are information-sharing 
relationships. 
The strength of the network depends on the mixture of strong and weak ties, and 
how well the network is able to utilize both types of ties and relationships to work 
together towards a common purpose. This research assesses that the GSN currently has 
an appropriate mixture of weak and strong ties. However, it is too early to judge how well 
the GSN is utilizing these ties to create the common picture so that the members can 
contribute towards a common purpose. 
b. The Structure of the Network 
The structural pattern of a network is the most tangible of a network´s property: It 
is the aspect of the network that can be drawn and visualized.100 See Figure 9. The  
 
                                                 
99 FCC-Functional Component Command. In addition to USSOCOM, the U.S. military has two 
additional FCCs: U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Transportation Command. 
100 Anklam, Net Work, 51. 
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overall GSN consists of multiple structures within the sub-networks:101 
 Hierarchy structure in the U.S. SOF network 
 Hub and Spoke structure from USSOCOM to the PNs and the inter-agency 
 Mesh between the PNs within the J3-I 
 Federated network toward the GCC/FCC. 
Looking at Figure 9, the overall GSN has to some extent a core/periphery 
structure. USSOCOM and the different organizations and nations with a Liaison Officer 
(LO) in USSOCOM are the core and the members that do not have an LO in USSOCOM 
are located on the periphery. The reason for this claim is that all the members that have a 
LO in USSOCOM have only one degree of separation and have more active ties among 
one other, while the members that do not have an LO in USSOCOM are separated by two 
or more degrees of separation and will automatically have a less active relationship.  
However, another relevant criterion for active membership can be a PN’s level of 
engagement in the J3-I’s processes to address common interests. A PN’s LO at 
USSOCOM J3-I, with only one degree of separation, who is not used for national 
interests and contributing to common purposes with other PNs in the GSN may, 
according to network structure, be positioned in the core of the network, but in practice 
have a less active partnership. 
c. The Topography of the Network 
Topography is described by Anklam as “Texture,” which is the sum of all ties 
within the network. The texture/topography gives insight into the resilience of the 
network. Will the network withstand disturbance or will it just fall apart? A network’s 
texture can be measured or analyzed through examining the network’s density, distance, 
centrality, and if it is open or closed. 
The density of the GSN is assessed as relatively sparse based on the developed 
sociogram (Figure 9). There are elements of the network that have higher density, but 
                                                 
101 These structures can be inferred from Figure 3. The U.S. SOF hierarchy is illustrated by the 
authority ties (solid lines); the USSOCOM- PNs’ Hub and Spoke is visualized through the information 
sharing ties (dotted lines) from USSOCOM to the pink colored PN nodes; the federated network, including 
the GCC/FCC, can be interpreted with the “geographical” dispersion of these nodes in the figure. The scale 
of the figure does not allow for the mesh-like structure of J3-I to be visualized. 
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overall it is sparse. This will probably change in the future as the network continues to 
grow. Density of 100 percent means that everyone in the network is connected to 
everyone else.102  
Distance is a measure of how many people a piece of information needs to go 
through to get to everyone in the network. It indicates how quickly information can 
spread out across a network to reach all members.103 In the GSN the longest degree of 
separation is five degrees, which means that there are no more than five steps between 
one member with a problem and a member with the potential solution. In most cases it 
will be less than five degrees. As the GSN continues to grow the degrees of separation 
can both increase and decrease depending on the number of established brokers.104 
Centrality is the measure of how dependent a network is on one or two 
organizations. Currently the GSN is highly centralized around USSOCOM. The reason 
for this is that USSOCOM is the organization that has taken the initiative to facilitate the 
creation of the GSN and is the main champion of the network. The centralization around 
USSOCOM might be less obvious in the future. Perhaps the future will show a slight 
shift from USSOCOM to the TSOC’s when the GSN starts to perform, and/or a slight 
shift to the PN’s being more self-organizing outside of USSOCOM facilitation. 
The open or closed metric describes how the network interacts with the outside. 
This is how the network balances the external ties with the internal ties. Is the network 
open for outsiders to join the network or is it closed? GSN is an open network that 
actively tries to connect with outside elements to grow and expand. However, some sub-
networks are more closed to external ties because of the nature of compartmentalization 
for operational security and foreign disclosure. This is most prominent within the 
intelligence community and the inter-agency (IA). This will be discussed further in the 
section on the style of the network. 
                                                 
102 The analysis has not used analysis software to develop the various metrics. 
103 Anklam, Net Work, 74. 
104 A broker is defined as a node, in this case, an organization that makes connections across groups. 
Anklam, Net Work, 77. 
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d. The Coordination Infrastructure of the Network 
Aware of the difficulties associated with sharing of information between nations 
and organizations, the GSN is utilizing what is called the All Partners Access Network 
(APAN) as an unclassified information-sharing service. The U.S. Department of Defense 
(DOD) has used this system with great success for over a decade, primarily to coordinate 
disaster relief and organize multinational exercises and conferences.105 The APAN 
system is a good example of the network’s informal relations. Because this system is 
unclassified and accessible to everyone in the network it promotes a heterarchical 
structure of coordination. (See “Network Design Continuum” in Chapter II, for more 
information.) 
As a network of military organizations, the GSN has a need for a classified 
information-sharing system as well. BICES-X, based on the already existing NATO 
Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES), offers a potential 
solution to this challenge; however, it is currently not widely fielded. The BICES system 
is distributed through the chain of command (top-down distribution), and because the 
system has more restrictions when it comes to access, it promotes a more hierarchical 
coordination structure within the network (see “Network Design Continuum” in Chapter 
II). Figure 11 shows USSOCOM’s plan for Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) infrastructure within the GSN. 
                                                 
105 USSOCOM, ISOF Conference 2014, Senior Leader Guide. 
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Figure 11.  GSN planned communication infrastructure.106 
All of these systems can be utilized as a tool for collaboration, a forum for 
information sharing, and a virtual workspace to enhance collaboration with a goal of 
creating a common picture within the network. 
The last enhancing element to connectedness and information sharing is the LO’s 
ability to connect to their national systems, allowing rapid reach back to their own 
countries. In addition, USSOCOM hosts the International SOF Conference (ISOF 
Conference) biannually in Tampa, creating a venue for face-to-face meetings and 
discussions. 
e. The Governance and Leadership of the Network 
Governance is the fine art and delicate practice of guiding and steering a network 
in a steady operational state. Governance is not static but flexible, attuned to the 
environment, and capable of change.107  
                                                 
106 USSOCOM, “Operationalizing the Global SOF Network,” (J3I-Brief). 
107 Anklam, Net Work, 59. 
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USSOCOM, as the champion of the GSN, has taken on the governance role of 
facilitating, and synchronizing the Global SOF effort. Thus, within the U.S. SOF network 
decision-making tends to be centralized. However, decision-making in other parts of the 
GSN is decentralized and differs within the various sub-networks. For example, for the 
PN sub-network and the IA sub-network, the decision-making is done within each 
organization/nation based on individual interest and needs. In short, the GSN has overall 
shared governance, which makes the Leadership and Management of the GSN a 
challenge; there is no one single leader of the network. This makes the synchronization 
and information sharing even more important to enable members of the network to make 
decisions based on a common picture. Another example of how USSOCOM is building 
commitment to the networks’ purpose is the biannual ISOF Conference, which is a venue 
for the PNs to raise their concerns and be part of the discussion.  
One important aspect that Milward and Provan highlight in their inter-
organizational network research is that the leaders or managers of a network must first 
understand what type of network they are managing and its purpose.108 Their research 
has identified four distinct types of networks: Service Implementation Networks, 
Information Diffusion Networks, Problem Solving Networks, and Community Capacity 
Building Networks.109 Through this lens, the GSN is a combination of the information 
diffusion, problem solving, and capacity building networks. All of these objectives and 
purposes are built into the overall purpose of the GSN: sharing information to build the 
collective capacity with the ultimate goal of solving new challenges. 
The next step for a network manager is to perform essential tasks that ensure the 
network is successful. Milward and Provan’s five broad and essential tasks that managers 
must perform, described in Chapter II Table 2, were: Management of Accountability, 
Management of Legitimacy, Management of Conflict, Management of Governance, and 
Management of Commitment.110 We return to these issues in Chapter IV when we review 
                                                 




the tasks essential both to the role of the Managers of Networks, and Managers in 
Networks (see Table 2 in Chapter II and Figure 11 in Chapter IV).111 As the GSN has not 
started its performance phase, the most important task at this point is the management of 
the governance structure to secure the GSN’s accountability, legitimacy, and its ability to 
handle future conflicts and commitments.112 These management tasks are further 
discussed and developed from the PN perspective in Chapter IV. 
Provan and Kenis’ three basic forms of network governance, as described in 
Chapter II, include: Self-governance, Lead Organization governance, and Network 
Administrative Organization (NAO) governance.113 They have different strengths and 
weaknesses and have to match up with the network’s structure and purpose (see Table 3 
and Figure 5 in Chapter II). This aspect of network management is also further discussed 
in Chapter IV. 
Based on the creation of the J3-I and the GMSC within USSOCOM, it appears 
that USSOCOM has adopted the form of a Network Administrative Organization for the 
overall network. USSOCOM is facilitating and synchronizing the day-to-day 
management through a focus on strategic/global involvement. The synchronization and 
facilitation is done through the Global Mission Support Center (GMSC) and the J3-I staff 
procedures. One way that USSOCOM manages this process is through the Campaign 
Synch Process (see Figure 12).  
                                                 
111 Milward and Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks. 
112 Accountability and legitimacy will be further discussed later in this project. 
113 Milward and Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks. 
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Figure 12.  Campaign synchronization process.114 
The campaign synch process (Figure 12) is a one-year planning cycle with a 
three-year planning focus. Based on the strategic guidance the GMSC and the J3-I 
manages this process for multiple problem sets around the world. The model illustrates 
PN involvement in each phase through the inputs and outputs.  
A complicating factor to this synchronization is that the different sub-networks 
have different forms of network governance. The PN network has a self-governing 
network, where all members manage participation and the individual 
organizations/nations make their own decisions. Within the U.S. SOF network, 
USSOCOM has the lead organization form, which is more centralized and formal. The 
different forms of governance can present both advantages and disadvantages for network 
performance. It can provide sub-networks more autonomy, but again it can be difficult to 
create a strong commitment toward the overall purpose of the network. 
                                                 
114 USSOCOM, “Operationalizing the Global SOF Network,” (J3I-Brief). 
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f. Roles, Tasks, Activities, Operations, and Processes within the Network 
(1) Roles 
Anklam describes the roles in a network through the categories of stakeholders, 
choreographers, and orchestrators, and structural roles of governance and 
infrastructure.115 The main stakeholder in the GSN is the founder and driver, 
USSOCOM. The lack of outspoken and salient supporters at the policy level as well as at 
the highest levels of defense raises the stakes for USSOCOM. The GSN needs buy-in 
from the U.S. military, interagency, and policy level and from PNs on the initiative. The 
other U.S. stakeholders within the network such as the interagency, departments, and 
military services will to some degree be affected, but mostly in the areas of cooperation 
and sharing. A PN with national internal security challenges will benefit from better 
coordinated and sustained support from the network. An expeditionary capable PN can 
possibly foresee access to supporting resources and information from the vast U.S. SOF 
capacities when conducting SOF operations abroad.  
USSOCOM confirms Anklam’s notion that successful networks need the 
choreographer and orchestrator to “stay with the show.”116 The original architects that 
established the NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC) with Admiral McRaven in 
2006 have been intimately involved in the overall GSN concept development as well as 
the ISCC and J3-I progress.117  
The GSN has been developed on the U.S. SOF “frame,” which naturally results in 
USSOCOM holding most of the structural roles. USSOCOM fits Anklam’s governance 
roles of network leader and “steering group.” However, discussions point to USSOCOM 
desires for more PN LOs/staff officers in the lead of planning and coordination events 
                                                 
115 Anklam, Net Work, 136‒140. 
116 Ibid., 137. 
117 Two of the GSN architects are Colonel (USA, Ret.) Stuart Bradin, who after his recent retirement 
continues to head the Global SOF Foundation, and Colonel (USA, Ret.) Mark Rosengard, who has been 
employed as a contractor to work in the USSOCOM ISCC/J3-I. 
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within the J3-I.118 Hence, USSOCOM is trying to reduce the perception of U.S. 
leadership in the network. Further, USSOCOM frames its role as “synchronizer” of the 
global SOF effort.119 PNs with LOs in J3-I can be defined as core members, while 
peripheral members can be seen as PNs without permanent U.S. SOF presence in their 
country or without LOs at USSOCOM. PN with permanent U.S. SOF in their country 
and/or with well-developed regional U.S. SOF cooperation might fall closer to the core 
member definition. 
The USSOCOM’s infrastructural roles fall within Anklam’s classifications of 
meeting coordinator, facilitator, and communicator. As with the structural governance 
roles, USSOCOM rotates other nation’s representatives as meeting coordinator and 
working-group leaders to decrease its dominance. However, USSOCOM will continue as 
the main facilitator and communicator for the GSN. The notion of rotating staff leaders 
indicates informality within J3-I.120 
Another way to define the roles within the GSN might be: USSOCOM as 
facilitator and synchronizer; TSOCs as user (of U.S. SOF assets); intelligence agencies as 
intelligence/information sharers and receivers; departments as co-coordinators of the 
whole-of-government approaches; expeditionary capable PNs as burden sharers; and 
internally focused PNs as receivers of SOF support. 
(2) Tasks 
Tasks are defined as the basic jobs, their level of formalization, and their 
specifications required.121 The basic tasks for the GSN can be found in the GMSC, which 
has the following responsibility: maintain global awareness; provide responsive support 
                                                 
118 Colonel (USA, Ret.) Mark Rosengard is one of original architects of the GSN concept. Discussions 
during International SOF Conference, May 21, 2014. 
119 USSOCOM, “ISCC Processes and Battle Rhythm,” (Information Brief, April 30, 2014, 
PowerPoint). 
120 Anklam, Net Work, 140. 
121 Roberts, “Organizational Systems Framework.” 
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to TSOCs and components; and manage the strategic battle rhythm.122 J3-I, which is 
integrated within the GMSC, holds the following tasks: maintain common picture of 
(PN’s) shared interests; facilitate and institutionalize mission PN relationships; and 
catalyze PN collaboration, integration, interoperability, and interdependence. Further, J3-
I holds the task to identify and suggest multinational solutions to problems. This is done 
for Commander USSOCOM purposes, as well as for the PN SOCOMs that have invested 
in the GSN effort.123 
The J3-I’s mission statement is as follows: 
Maximize mission partner nation integration in HQ USSOCOM staff 
processes to inform strategic planning and resourcing, and accelerate 
development of multilateral courses of action and cooperation among our 
global SOF partners in support of the partner nations, TSOCs, and 
Geographic Combatant Commands.124 
These tasks require a certain level of structure and formalization, which 
USSOCOM has created and manages through the campaign synchronization process (see 
Figure 12). 
For example, one task is the effort to standardize reporting formats and routines. 
As USSOCOM describes it in the Senior Leader’s Guide for the ISOF conference: “in 
order to network an enterprise, we need … a disciplined battle rhythm.”125 Staff officers 
and PN LOs conducting these tasks have a certain degree of specification visible in the 
job qualifications.126 
 
                                                 
122 USSOCOM, Job Description: Part 1, Job Identification (Special Operations Liaison Officer to HQ 
USSOCOM, Foreign Liaison Officer), DRAFT 1. Tampa, Florida, 2014.  
123 USSOCOM, “ISCC Processes and Battle Rhythm,” (Information Brief). Other tasks within the 
GSN are mostly “military staff actions,” such as information, planning and coordination meetings, Inter-
agency/ LO coordination and/or input, etc., and are seen as common knowledge to the reader, hence not 
described in this paper.  
124 USSOCOM, “Operationalizing the Global SOF Network,” (J3I-Brief). 
125 USSOCOM, ISOF Conference 2014, Senior Leader Guide, 7. 
126 USSOCOM, Job Description. For example, suggested PN LO standards include Command and 
Staff College, English proficiency level 3/3, SOF qualified on command level, and experience at the 
national military strategic level. 
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(3) Operations and Processes 
The description of Operations and Processes will be limited to what Roberts 
defines as Communication Information Planning and Decision Making. This is how the 
GSN communicates, manages information, plans, and is involved in decision-making.127 
Communication is conducted through a combination of standard military 
reporting according to a set battle rhythm as well as informal information sharing. 
Notably, video teleconferences (VTCs) are regularly used to conduct meetings, such as 
the COM USSOCOM regularly scheduled meeting/VTC with all the TSOC commanders. 
The overall purpose of the communication is to develop and maintain the “common 
picture.” The communication is a mix of regularly scheduled reports and meetings; ad 
hoc communication related to crisis response, and “deep dive” meetings to improve the 
understanding in a specific area. Included in the GSN communication, as described 
earlier in the chapter, is the use of APAN as a forum for unclassified communication and 
the utilization of BICES for classified SOF forums. Articles, regional situation 
summaries, and other SOF-related topics are posted on the APAN web page. In summary, 
the communication is a mix of written correspondence, phone calls, VTCs, and face-to-
face meetings. They are either conducted within the framework of GMSC/J3-I, or via the 
APAN webpage. 
This study has limited information on the actual information management 
procedures. However, discussions have identified some challenges for the PN LOs in 
communicating via secure national means to their national HQ.128 For example, the J3-I 
is separated from the “U.S.-only” GMSC. The planned distribution of BICES-X will 
improve the capability in this area by establishing a common communication network for 
sharing of classified information. This system also will enable selected groups, or 
enclaves, to share classified information. For example, during combined/coalition 
operations, an enclave for collaboration can be established so that only the involved 
                                                 
127 Roberts, “Organizational Systems Framework.” 
128 The J3-I premises are prepared for PNs national secure communications. The frictions in this 
regard are related to the respective PNs’ efforts to establish the national communication system. 
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countries (the burden sharers) share information without disclosure to other PNs (shown 
in Figure 11). 
The principle outline of the GSN strategic level facilitation and planning 
procedures between USSOCOM and the PNs has recently been updated (see Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13.  U.S. and PN´s facilitation and planning process.129 
This is the framework for how PNs will integrate into the overall long-term SOF 
campaign plan (see Figure 12 and 13), as well as collaborate on emergent issues. The 
campaign design process includes PNs’ input of national strategic guidance, and national 
interests and issues to identify potential partners and requirements. For example, when a 
problem is identified and framed solutions are developed into concepts including multi-
national approaches, required resources, and required level of accesses. When national 
approval from the contributing PNs is attained, the J3-I continues detailed planning for 
possible execution.130  
Emergent crisis collaboration includes PNs’ input with national information and 
possible requests for support (RFS). Pending time available for strategic planning, there 
                                                 
129 USSOCOM, “Operationalizing the Global SOF Network,” (J3I-Brief). 
130 USSOCOM, “ISCC Processes and Battle Rhythm,” (Information Brief), 7. This is J3-I’s intention. 
Detailed planning is also done at the TSOC level. This might be a challenge for small contributing PNs. 
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will be staff procedures including analysis, regional and functional issue forums, and 
coordination among PNs. These processes then will develop into a common picture, 
concept collaboration, COAs, CONOPs and resource solutions.131  
Decision-making in relations to the GSN is described previously (see 
“Governance and Leadership of the Network”). In short, decision making outside of the 
U.S. SOF realm is decentralized to the PN’s national decision-making process, which in 
turn is often related to UN, NATO, EU, and AU decision-making processes.132 These 
decisions often result from a collaborative process among PNs. 
g. The Style of the Network 
The style of a network can be found in the unique-shaping key factors of locus, 
culture, interaction and orientation, which in turn influence the design of the network.133 
(1) Locus 
Locus is where the network “lives” and can be divided into the dimensions of a 
real place, information space, and interaction pace.134 While the GSN is globally 
dispersed physically, USSOCOM facilitates the J3-I with real place localities that are 
adjacent to the GMSC. The new localities are designed specifically to meet anticipated 
needs and procedures within J3-I described earlier.135  
                                                 
131 USSOCOM, “ISCC Processes and Battle Rhythm,” (Information brief), 10. 
132 The PN can also conduct unilateral or bilateral operations outside the framework of these alliances 
based on political approval. 
133 Anklam, Net Work, 81. Anklam also includes Leadership within the Style factors. This paper 
analyzes leadership separately. 
134 Ibid., 81‒82. 
135 The authors’ visit at J3-I on May 19, 2014. The office design is composed of open spaces 
promoting informal communications and spontaneous meetings, as well as space for secure group meetings 
or individual secure communication back to the PN. 
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The virtual workspace, or information space, is created through the APAN 
platform, allowing for unclassified information sharing and collaboration in the GSN.136 
Classified information will require the use of BICES or national communications means 
between PN LO at J3-I and the PN. Admiral McRaven describes the idea (maybe with a 
focus on the U.S.-specific capacities): “The C4I structure flattens the network and 
enables all levels to reach out to get what they need.”137  
The interaction pace within the GSN is met through USSOCOM’s, and more 
specifically, J3-I’s Battle Rhythm. COM USSOCOM holds regular VTCs with GCC and 
TSOCs. The J3-I is integrated in the schedule with VTCs and other correspondence with 
the PNs.138 Anklam would classify the ISOF conference as an event, which all networks 
might require to refresh and revitalize themselves.139 
(2) Culture 
How the network is experienced is dependent on the tone-setting cultural factors, 
which include identity, core values, and cultural norms. These factors affect the social 
capital of the network.140 
The name of the network—the Global SOF Network—appeals to the identity of 
the members, regardless of nationality: Special Operation Forces emphasizes the people 
in the organization as the main strength. The personnel are what make SOF “special”: 
attracting and preserving the right people with a high standard of training and education, 
empowered with advanced technology. USSOCOM advocates for the need to cultivate 
                                                 
136 USSOCOM, ISOF Conference 2014, Senior Leader Guide, 7‒8. Videoconferencing (VTCs) can 
easily be arranged. Various GSN communities have established sites/forums; Training, Aviation, Regional 
Groups, and Joint Intelligence Center. It is too early to evaluate the architecture and design of this effort. 
Will it be useful and purposeful? Anklam, Net Work,85. 
137 William McRaven, Briefing during GEOINT 2013 Symposium, Tampa, Florida. 14–17 April, 
2013. http://geointv.com/archive/geoint-2013-keynote-adm-william-h-mcraven/ 
138 USSOCOM, “ISCC Processes and Battle Rhythm,” (Information Brief). 
139 Anklam, Net Work, 88, 90.  
140 Ibid., 92. In this project, the term “social capital” is used interchangeably with “trust.” 
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this unique SOF culture and to continue to invest in people to be able to operate in any 
future environment.141 
Successful networks often include the core values of openness, diversity, and 
transparency. These properties complement each other.142 The GSN, as has been 
described previously, is an open network due to its bridges to other networks and its 
active use of those bridges: USSOCOM has LOs at more than 20 agencies in the United 
States, as well as Special Operations Liaison Officers (SOLOs) connected to U.S. country 
teams in many high interest countries. Moreover, the GSN bridges through each PN’s 
existing national networks. The diversity within GSN is manifested through the variety of 
PN capacities and their ethnical, religious, security, and political contexts together with 
the inclusion of various agencies, departments, academia, and think tanks. The 
transparency, which Anklam asserts as required for problem solving and innovation, is 
clearly indicated as in the example of the creation of the J3-I inside USSOCOM, and the 
enhanced cooperation with U.S. IA. However, the compartmentalization does limit 
transparency in areas of operational security and certain capacities.143 
The cultural norms covered in this analysis are the specific norms of commitment 
to the collective and trust.144 The fact that a PN can have purposes for participating in a 
specific action other than the overall network can affect the commitment to the collective. 
Anklam points specifically to the commitment to build and sustain relationships as a core 
obligation of the work within the network:145 How much effort the PNs are willing to 
spend on building and sustaining relationships depends on USSOCOM’s ability to 
address this need (see also Chapter IV about PN’s management of commitment).  
One of the main objectives of the GSN is to build trust among and between 
partners. The extent network members are able to freely seek and share information, and 
                                                 
141 USSOCOM, ISOF Conference 2014: Senior Leader Guide, 12. 
142 Anklam, Net Work, 93, 97‒98. 
143 The authors, imbued with NORSOF and SWESOF policies, assess the USSOCOM/GSN approach 
in regard to transparency as almost surprisingly inclusive and open. 
144 Anklam, Net Work, 98. 
145 Ibid., 99. 
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ideas and insight is one way to build trust.146 The USSOCOM effort for improved 
information sharing to partners must be credited as an honest effort. Admiral McRaven, 
when he was Commander USSOCOM, constantly pushed his own organization as well as 
the intelligence community to improve information sharing within the network. However, 
USSOCOM seldom “owns” the information, making the information sharing challenging. 
Discussions with USSOCOM personnel confirm the situation: information sharing will 
be the most challenging piece to operationalize in the GSN concept.147 However, beyond 
the scholarly view of network trust, there are other means for trust building in the military 
context that can somewhat mitigate the information issue: the conduct of combined 
operations as well as support with resources and/or combined training events. As, 
USSOCOM officials point out, the trust has been built within the SOF community 
throughout the last 13 years of combat and the GSN initiative should be seen as an action 
to specifically upholding this trust.148 
Holohan also associates trust with the network culture and argues for a constant 
effort: “Trust … has to be continually produced on the ground.”149 This notion of a “local 
approach” to establish and maintain trust is acknowledged by USSOCOM: 
Networks are rooted in relationships. Building global relationships 
requires trust and, at its foundation, can only be achieved by persistently 
engaging and operating with the population of fragile, inherently unstable 
places, and those populations that appear stable.150 
                                                 
146 Anklam, Net Work, 100. 
147 Louis Rachal (Deputy Current Ops (J-33), USSOCOM) in discussions with the authors during 
International SOF Conference, Tampa, Florida. May 19, 2014; Major General J.Timothy Leahy (Director 
of Operations (J 3), USSOCOM), in discussion with the authors during International SOF Conference, 
Tampa, Florida. May 19, 2014; Rear Admiral Robert D. Sharp (Director for Intelligence (J 2), USSOCOM) 
in discussions with the authors during International SOF Conference, Tampa, Florida. May 19, 2014; Major 
General Marshall B. Webb (Commander of Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR)) in 
discussions with the authors during International SOF Conference, Tampa, Florida. May 22, 2014. 
148 William J.A. Miller  (Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy (J 5), USSOCOM) in discussions with 
the authors during International SOF Conference, Tampa, Florida. May 19, 2014. 
149 Holohan, Networks of Democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 72. 
Holohan also relates trust directly to identification of mission, information transfer, and collaborative 
problem-solving capabilities. Leadership is vital in establishing these connections. 
150 USSOCOM, Commanders Appreciation: The Strategic Environment, 2. 
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(3) Interaction 
The style of the network, and its capacity to achieve its purpose, is illustrated both 
through the type of interaction that dominates, and also through the member’s ability to 
know which type of interaction to use at a given time. Anklam divides it into three types: 
transactional (task-typed), knowledge-based, and personal (relational) interactions.151 
The GSN seems to have a managed, distinguished, and relevant mix of transactional, 
relational, and knowledge-based interactions. Transactional interactions can be illustrated 
through the sharing of information for action during a crisis response. Relational 
interaction can be illustrated through interactions between PNs based on personal 
friendships. Knowledge-based interaction is illustrated through USSOCOM/J3-I regular 
“deep dives” into certain problem sets inviting various expertise and leaders from PN, 
interagency, and U.S. SOF to video teleconference (VTC) discussions.152 
(4) Orientation 
Outcome-focused network designs for production might have a somewhat 
hierarchical structure with more formal relations, while a discovery-and-learning network 
might have more of a mesh-like structure with more informal relations.153 Our 
assessment is that the GSN balances the two approaches well, with an emphasis on the 
outcome orientation so that it becomes a viable option for the political leadership. 
However, in this early phase of development the main effort is to establish routines for 
dialogue and cooperation with partners, and in that regard few tensions or issues have 
been identified. As one of the USSOCOM leaders stated: “J3-I creates the opportunities 
to discuss.”154 
                                                 
151 Anklam, Net Work, 102‒107. 
152 Brigadier Mark Smethurst, Australian Armed Forces (Deputy Director of Special Operations (J3-I), 
USSOCOM) in discussions with the authors during International SOF Conference, Tampa, Florida. May 
20, 2014. See also USSOCOM, “ISCC Processes and Battle Rhythm,” (Information Brief). 
153 Anklam, Net Work, 107. 
154 Smethurst, in discussions with the authors during International SOF Conference. 
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4. Placement on the Design Continuum 
As a summary of the description of the GSN, we have used the network design 
continuum to visualize how the network functions.155 As described in Chapter II, the 
overall design continuum spans the two extremes of Anarchy Network to Organized 
Network. The analysis has evaluated the GSN on the four dimensions: unbounded-
bounded membership, informal-formal interaction, heterarchical-hierarchical 
coordination, and shared-centralized governance. 
Unbounded-Bounded Membership is a dimension that describes how open or 
closed a network is towards external actors within its environment. The GSN is an open 
network, which encourages diverse nodes to join. Even though anyone can apply for 
membership, USSOCOM controls the decision to admit new members based on U.S. 
national interests and policies. The fact that there is no formal cost of joining the network 
supports the basis of it being an open network. Overall the GSN is placed on the left side 
of the scale on this metric. 
Informal-Formal Interaction is a dimension that shows the level of formality 
within the network when its members interact. One of the important objectives of the 
GSN is to increase the informal interaction between the different nodes. Referring to the 
previous discussion regarding ties, governance, and leadership, one can argue that the 
GSN on the organizational level is relatively informal. Admiral McRaven seems to, from 
the authors’ perspective, be aware of and put effort into continuous dialogue with 
network leaders. The social events planned and conducted during the ISOF conference 
suggest dedicated effort in this regard. On the other hand, because the network is based 
on military and government cultures we found formalities within the work processes, 
such as a structured and disciplined battle rhythm and bilateral agreement directing the 
sharing of information. Overall, we placed the GSN on the left-center on this dimension. 
Heterarchical-Hierarchical Coordination is a dimension that shows how 
coordination among the nodes occurs. The GSN uses both heterarchical and hierarchical 
coordination based on the task performed. An example is APAN discussions versus 
                                                 
155 Roberts, “Network Design Continuum.”  
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classified information sharing over BICES. The military organizations within the network 
are by nature hierarchical; the same is also true for most of the other government 
organizations, so tasks are coordinated in a hierarchical fashion. On the other hand, one 
of the reasons for creating the network was to flatten the way members are coordinated. 
The informal relations among the partner nations suggest more heterarchical 
coordination. Overall we placed the GSN in the center of this dimension. 
Shared-centralized governance is the dimension that describes who governs. The 
GSN has both shared and centralized governance, depending on the sub-network 
examined and the type of task performed. Within the U.S. SOF network, the governance 
is highly centralized around USSOCOM as the functional COCOM for U.S. SOF.156 But, 
then again, an examination of the PN sub-network reveals governance that is highly 
shared, as well as decentralized decision making to the different nations. Overall the GSN 
is placed on the center-left on this metric. 
Based on the positions of the four elements and making an overall judgment for 
the GSN on where it stands on the continuum between an Anarchic Network and an 
Organized Network, we have placed it slightly left of center. See Figure 14 for the 
visualization of the design continuum. 
                                                 
156 Decision-making regarding U.S. SOF operations are centralized around the GCC and respective 
TSOC, while strategic level decisions, procurement, and development issues are centralized to USSOCOM.  
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Figure 14.  GSN placement on the design continuum. 
B. ANALYSIS OF THE NETWORK 
1. The Evolution of the Network 
Members of the international SOF community have been engaging each other 
globally for decades, both in training and in active exchange of lessons learned. During 
the last decade in Afghanistan and Iraq, the cooperation and collaboration among 
different SOF units, and between the SOF community and the IA, have been at an 
extremely high level. This common experience was so important that the leadership 
within the U.S. SOF community saw a need to establish a method to continue this 
cooperation after Afghanistan and Iraq.  
The idea of a GSN was born out of a need for continued cooperation and 
collaboration to address asymmetrical threats realizing that no single nation can meet the 
21st environment alone in the coming fiscal reality. Starting in 2011, USSOCOM 
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introduced the GSN concept in the SOF vision for 2020. However, the evolution of the 
GSN has occurred mainly in the last two years. 
Sustaining a network at its full capacity to accomplish its purpose and to produce 
value for its stakeholders is the result of intentional activities during its development and 
growth.157 The GSN is still in its growth phase, and is in need of strong and persistent 
management to maintain the traction needed on the political level both within the United 
States and within the PNs.  
The relationship between accountability and trust has been revealed through 
stakeholders’ criticism of USSOCOM’s GSN effort. Lawmakers have expressed concern 
about oversight and accountability in USSOCOM’s ambitious and controversial network 
strategy. USSOCOM faces challenges with informing and convincing policymakers of 
support to this effort.158 Although the official documentation shows that the GSN aims 
are clearly nested in the national defense strategies, this is not enough to avoid criticism 
for overreach.159 
Some of the principal milestones within the GSN evolution are the IA 
cooperation, the PN cooperation, and the creation of the ICT portal and web 2.0. IA 
cooperation has evolved from none/sparse cooperation in the beginning of the Afghan 
and Iraq conflicts to robust cooperation with USSOCOM LOs in 20 different agencies 
and departments, and reciprocal IA LOs at USSOCOM. It is reasonable to assume that 
USSOCOM will have future expectations on PNs to improve their internal interagency 
efforts. PN cooperation has moved from a “Coalition village” outside of CENTCOM and 
USSOCOM supporting both headquarters with a mix of conventional and SOF LOs to an 
established ISCC within USSOCOM as a pure SOF LO entity, and further, to what is 
                                                 
157 Anklam, Net Work, 63. 
158 Paul McLeary, “Lawmakers Skeptical of Global Spec Ops Plan.” The U.S. House Armed Services 
Committee refused the USSOCOM 2014 request for $ 25 million for establishing a Washington office and 
Regional SOF Coordination Centers in Colombia and Hawaii. See also, Paul McLeary, “Special Ops 
Nominee Wants Review of SOCOM Initiatives,” defensenews.com, October 11, 2013. 
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131011/DEFREG02/310110015/Special-Ops-Nominee-Wants-
Review-SOCOM-Initiatives. 
159 USSOCOM, SOF 2020 Global SOF Network, 5. 
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today: the J3-I Division as part of USSOCOM’s J3 shop. Figure 15 shows the current PN 
cooperation within USSOCOM and where USSOCOM is planning to take this 
cooperation in the near- and long-term future. 
 
Figure 15.  J3-I/TSOC current and future PN representatives.160 
Recently, USSOCOM is reaffirming that the TSOCs are the primary owners of 
PN SOF relationships within their respective Areas of Responsibilities (AOR), but that 
many PNs have cross-AOR capabilities and responsibilities. The decision whether a PN 
should have its LO at USSOCOM rather than at the TSOC is based on the PN SOF 
maturity, expeditionary capabilities, and responsibilities.161 
The ICT portal and web 2.0 have moved from a simple face-to-face coordination 
interface to the common platform of APAN and BICES162 that the network uses today. In 
addition to this, USSOCOM has created PN rooms for LOs to access their national 
systems for quick and secure reach-back to their national SOF headquarters. 
                                                 
160 USSOCOM, “Operationalizing the Global SOF Network,” (J3I-Brief). 
161 The topic of LO placement was discussed by several USSOCOM leaders in discussions with the 
authors during International SOF Conference. 
162 BICES-X is still under development and has currently not been distributed to the PNs. 
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Knowing that the GSN is still in its growth phase and looking at the progress over 
the last two years, it seems like USSOCOM has managed the network well as the 
network administrative organization, and has been able to acquire investment from the 
partners and the stakeholders. This administrative role will likely have to continue for 
some time into the future until more PNs are able to increase burden sharing and the 
network is able to self-organize among the members. 
2. The Network “Fit” 
a. The Network “Fit” with the Environment 
To look at the “fit” between the GSN and the environment we will focus on two 
main environmental elements that will impact the GSN. First, the 21st century threat 
environment is fast moving, asymmetrical, complex, and networked with a high degree of 
instability. Second, the next decade will continue to face economic constraints, which 
will demand reductions within military forces and will shrink each nation’s capacity for 
handling new challenges alone. 
From the perspective of the design continuum, the GSN as a whole has a 
relatively good “fit” to the environment. On the continuum area of informal cooperation 
and shared governance, where the GSN is placed to the center-left, the network also 
shows a good “fit” with regard to the threat environment. By utilizing informal 
cooperation and shared governance, the network will have more flexibility and the ability 
to move information quicker within the network. Being aware that a military organization 
will never become a totally informal or decentralized entity, the GSN has found a good 
middle ground and focused on those tasks and processes that can be informal and 
decentralized. 
The openness and unbounded membership make the network “fit” well in the 
fiscally restrained environment currently challenging all military forces. Growing the 
GSN into this global entity and focusing on utilizing each other’s capacities while sharing 
the burden between the members fits perfectly to the projected economic environment.163 
                                                 
163 To confirm this analysis would require “success stories” of measurable cost savings. 
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At the same time, the main purpose of the GSN is playing directly to the political 
ambition of holistic approaches that are cost effective with a low footprint while 
maintaining the option of persistent presence to support national interests in the future. 
Most of the national strategies espouse whole-of-government approaches, which the GSN 
is trying to develop. 
The governing style of USSOCOM as the network administrative organization fits 
well with the development phase of the GSN. The main focus is to legitimize the GSN on 
the political level and at the same time start the development of a common picture to 
identify common interests. To accomplish this effort, the network has to have an entity 
like USSOCOM that facilitates and synchronizes these processes and keeps the different 
PNs accountable for their contribution.    
In summary, the GSN appears to be a good “fit” with the current environment but 
will have to continuously monitor the environment to be able to evolve to address gaps 
that may emerge. 
b. The “Fit” among Design Elements. 
The analysis of “fit” among Design Elements uses Roberts’ grouping of design 
factors: tasks, technology, structure, people, and processes.164 See Figure 6 in Chapter II. 
The factor of leadership will be added to the analysis.  
The processes include communication, information management, planning, and 
decision making as well as the aforementioned interactions. The processes together with 
GMSC and the J3-I’s basic tasks, as described earlier, have been developed according to 
the network structure. The structure includes the USSOCOM’s hierarchical structure, the 
mesh-like structure of the J3-I internal apparatus, and the hub-and-spoke structure of the 
USSOCOM’s relations out to the PNs and interagency. Further, the supporting 
technology, APAN websites and BICES, is adapted to the tasks and processes 
requirements for both an open communications means for collaborative learning, and the 
                                                 
164 Roberts, “Organizational Systems Framework.” 
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need for classified information sharing.165 The leadership function is adapted to the 
structure of the various sub-networks. SOF, with its unique culture (people), makes the 
flattening of the network possible: one SOF leader describes this as using “SOF maturity 
and honesty.”166 Overall, the synch among the design factors gives the impression to 
have been thought through by the GSN designers. The network appears to have a 
relatively good internal fit between its elements. 
3. Network Design Tensions 
There are five major design tensions identified. They are: information sharing, 
cultural differences, burden sharing, the identification of common interests, and 
accountability. 
Information sharing. There is a great awareness within USSOCOM about the 
inherent challenges of sharing classified information, and great deal of effort has been 
focused on improvements in this area. The ongoing effort to distribute BICES-X is one 
example. Another example is to change the narrative: It is easier to share information 
than intelligence.167 However, in most cases, USSOCOM and PN SOF must fall back on 
intelligence sharing agreements between countries168 and the goodwill of intelligence 
agencies. If these agencies do not have incentives to share, why should they? One way to 
counter the argument of over-sharing is establishing specific PN groups in pre-operation 
planning phases where information can be more easily shared.169 But the assertion 
remains: the most important trust-building tool is restricted. Regardless of significant 
improvements, tensions in this field will be evident in the foreseeable future. 
                                                 
165 The various sub-networks have different ties, which implies relationships that vary from a need for 
“simple” information sharing to problem-solving collaboration. 
166 The U.S. SOF sub-network with USSOCOM is the lead organization and the PN network is a self-
governing network. The SOF personnel described in Style/ Culture category earlier, holds a unique culture. 
This is also visible in SOF truth # 1: Humans are more important than hardware. The quote is from 
Smethurst, in discussions with the authors during International SOF Conference. 
167 Rosengard, in discussions with the authors during International SOF Conference. 
168 These are often bilateral agreements between specific intelligence agencies, which complicate the 
GSN vision of enhanced information sharing. 
169 The BICES-X supports this kind of selected distribution of information. 
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Cultural differences. Tensions attributed to cultural differences between nodes in 
the network will certainly be an everyday issue. Perhaps the most obvious is the general 
differences between military and civilian organizations. Cultural differences between the 
SOF and the intelligence community are not exclusively a U.S. issue. SOFs also need 
access and high-resolution intelligence. The intelligence services prioritize among 
requirements and customers, and resist revealing information without exchange. Other 
issues are the different security cultures of the PNs. Some nations are relative open, and 
others are more closed when it comes to information about their SOF and activities. For 
example, looking at the United States, which has one relatively open side, called white 
SOF and one closed side, called black SOF, we find a different culture than that of a PN 
which has only one of these types.170 
Burden Sharing. Internal accountability is a potential design tension. USSOCOM 
desires future burden sharing, noting, “As we build the network we will require partners 
to share the burden.”171 This PN involvement can take many forms and there is a notable 
awareness among the GSN architects that PNs have different capabilities and capacities 
to contribute which may shift over time pending national interests. The logic that “give 
and share” or “participate and provide” might pay benefits is obvious. However, how 
should partners who do not seem to contribute be managed? Free-riders can negatively 
impact the openness and trust within the network (see also Chapter IV under 
“Management of Accountability”).  
Common Interests. The process of identifying common interest among PNs seems 
to be a wise idea to generate output and share burden in a complex multinational context 
challenged with information-sharing issues. However, there may be difficulties for PNs 
in defining useable strategic inputs in the process in the first place. For example, a small 
nation does not have the same global interest as the United States. Further, what tensions 
                                                 
170 Harvey Sapolsky, Benjamin Friedman, and Brendan Green, eds. U.S. Military Innovation Since the 
Cold War: Creation Without Destruction (New York: Routledge, 2009). White SOF are units whose 
existence are openly acknowledged by the U.S. government even if their operations are almost always 
classified and clandestine, for example, the U.S. Army Special Forces community. Black SOF are units 
(often referred to as Special Mission Units or SMUs) whose existence is not acknowledged and whose 
operations are not only always classified/clandestine, but often covert.  
171 USSOCOM, Commanders Appreciation: The Strategic Environment, 3. 
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and trust-reducing effects can follow if some of the PNs, including the United States, 
have contrary interests on a matter revealed during the process? Also, how are “national 
interests” defined? Are these actual national interests, or should these be defined as 
interests that PNs’ SOF want and can influence? 
Accountability. The GSN concept touches, sometimes to a high degree, the field 
of foreign policy. How is the trust and “top cover” for the GSN established at the policy 
level? Don Tapscott and Anthony Williams point to the challenges when 
“multistakeholder” networks claim larger roles treading on responsibility at the 
political/policy level.172 The policy level might perceive this enterprising, fast moving, 
cost driving, multinational network as somewhat out of its political control. Also, 
stakeholders may question the benefits. USSOCOM and some of the PN SOF leaders 
need to establish their legitimacy and accountability to the political masters: normal chain 
of command and national deployment procedures will not be changed (see also Chapter 
IV for more discussions about management of accountability and legitimacy). At the 
same time, the idea of sharing the costs and burdens to meet future threats is fiscally 
attractive to policy makers. In summary, Even though USSOCOM seems to be open and 
transparent in its messaging about the GSN, USSOCOM still has challenges reaching the 
target audiences. 
4. Networks´ Overall Strength and Weaknesses 
The GSN sub-networks create a multi-layer structure, which enables more global 
connections and therefore increases the density. The way the network communicates 
(pace of communication and interaction) supports a fast and robust network. However, 
the increased numbers of connections indicate something that might be seen as a 
weakness, or at least a risk: in spite of battle rhythms and information management 
procedures, there is an apparent risk of bypassing (by mistake) a node in the intense 
communication. This is particularly challenging for the military hierarchical structure 
within the network.  
                                                 
172 Don Tapscott and Anthony D Williams, Makrowikonomics: New Solutions for a Connected Planet 
(New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2012), 316‒319. 
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The texture reveals that the distances—the short “degrees of separation”—in the 
network support rapid response to external conditions as well as rapid distribution of 
information. The centralized position of USSOCOM in the network paired with the 
mesh-like structure within the J3-I, supports a common picture in the overall network:  
detailed situational awareness in the central hub can easily be distributed to peripheral 
nodes. In other words, it allows PN governments a new and “direct” source for situational 
awareness. 
For the PNs with LO presence in USSOCOM, the mesh-like structure of J3-I 
allows for day-to-day discussions and cooperation on concerns other than operational:  
identification of opportunities for training, procurement of hardware, and R&D projects 
can result in fruitful and cost-effective cooperation and collaboration.  
One possible weakness might be the establishment of PN LOs at HQ USSOCOM 
in Tampa, on the behalf of LOs at the regional hubs, the TSOCs.173 PNs with internal 
security concerns and with no ambition to deploy SOF abroad might have better use of an 
LO at the regional hub (TSOC) and not USSOCOM. 
Another possible weakness in the GSN effort is the fact that USSOCOM focuses 
on the TSOCs as “central of gravities,” while the PNs focus on USSOCOM. This is a 
potential friction mostly illuminated in operational contexts that has to be considered both 
by USSOCOM and the PNs. 
5. Performance of the Network 
An important element highlighted by Kenis and Provan is how to choose criteria 
for network performance. They believe that one should consider criteria only when a 
network has the ability to actually influence the criteria.174 As described in Chapter II, 
Kenis and Provan establish three exogenous performance factors that impact the choice 
                                                 
173 A few of the resource-rich PNs also have LOs at the TSOCs. However, many PNs might have to 
prioritize their resources on one location. A weakness that USSOCOM is aware of, and are looking at 
different solutions. The topic of LO placement was discussed by several USSOCOM leaders in discussions 
with the authors during International SOF Conference. 
174 Kenis and Provan, “Towards an Exogenous Theory of Public Network Performance.” 444–449 
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of criteria: The form of the network; whether the network is mandatory or voluntary; and 
the developmental stage of the network. 
The Network Form. Currently, USSOCOM is assessed as having the governance 
role as the network administrative organization. The command is currently focusing on 
synchronization of information to be able to develop the common picture within the 
network, and at the same time facilitating the growth of the network by creating the 
space, place, and pace for the members to interact and cooperate. Being a network of both 
U.S. organizations and PN organizations, this structure is probably the most appropriate 
for the GSN. At least for now in the growth phase, the network needs an administrative 
organization that can tie the different members together and take the initial burden of 
being the network administrator. USSOCOM is the only organization with the resources 
and ability to take on this responsibility today. This may change in the future when the 
network is more mature and has started its performance phase. 
Mandatory versus Voluntary. GSN is assessed to be a voluntary network and 
based on the following three criteria, appears to be operating well as a voluntary network: 
network legitimacy, activating capacity, and network climate.175 The aspect of network 
legitimacy is one of the most demanding tasks for USSOCOM, and is a focal point when 
dealing with the political leadership within the United States. The focus on partnerships 
and networking in the Quadrennial Defense Review 2014176(QDR) and the approval of 
the Global Campaign Plan-Special Operations confirms the GSN legitimacy. 
Additionally, each PN will have to create this legitimacy within their political leadership. 
The manner in which USSOCOM has included the IA and PNs has resulted in a strong 
and positive network climate, which is absolutely crucial at this stage of the network 
evolution. The establishment of the J3-I with the PN LOs and the IA LOs within 
                                                 
175 Kenis and Provan, “Towards an Exogenous Theory of Public Network Performance,” 449‒450. 
These are the three outcome-criteria that Van Raaij deemed to be appropriate for a voluntary network such 
as the GSN. 
176 Department of Defense, Qudrennial Defense Review 2014, Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2014. 
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USSOCOM has created the processes and the ability to have the activating capacity 
within the network.177 
The Development Stage. The GSN, still in its growth phase, should not yet be 
measured according to goal attainment. In this phase, most of the time and energy of 
USSOCOM’s J3-I and its members is expended developing the network structure and 
processes, rather than on achieving the network purpose outcomes.  
Based on USSOCOM´s network governance, its type, and its development stage, 
the following metrics can be used to measure GSN output and outcomes in its current 
growth phase:178 
 Output metrics: 
 # of member nations/organizations in the network (see Figure 15) 
 # of times GSN is mentioned in political/strategic documents (to 
measure the level of legitimacy) 
 # of participating member organizations and nations in the various 
network activities 
 ICT development (# of BICES distributed; # of APAN accounts 
created) 
 Outcome metrics: 
 Level of IA cooperation and integration 
 Level of PN cooperation and integration 
 Extend to which a common picture of PNs interests and intentions 
(and possibly objectives) are developed and distributed within the 
network 
 Extend to which the GSN becomes an instrument of choice for 
problem solving (legitimization) 
Based on the analysis of the GSN and the fact that it is still in its growth phase the 
network seems to perform well. The main metric during a growth phase of a network is to 
attract new members, which the current and future appointments of LOs at USSOCOM 
J3-I indicate is happening (See Figure 15). The GSN have faced some challenges with 
regards to stakeholder buy-in from the political and military leadership during its early 
phases of development. However, both the 2014 QDR and the signing of the Global 
                                                 
177 The value of USSOCOM’s IA LOs for PNs may rise should the PNs establish national IA nodes 
within their national network. 
178 In the future, other metrics could include: information developed and provided that influences 
decision making; generated alternatives solutions presented to commanders; and burden sharing examples. 
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Campaign Plan-Special Operations indicate that stakeholders are now supporting the 
initiative and that the GSN is becoming legitimate. 
C. SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS 
The GSN is a network of organizations with multiple sub-networks that are 
physically dispersed, creating a global and multilayered structure. The network is built 
upon the framework of the U.S. SOF organization and technology, which support 
bonding and the ability to communicate. The unique personal relationships and 
experience of SOF personnel from years of warfighting is a vehicle to realize this effort. 
Trust is to a certain degree already established within the SOF community—the challenge 
is to maintain and spread this trust further within the IA and the political community. 
The initiative to establish a GSN fits well with the U.S. strategic directives as well 
as to address foreseeable threats. The purposes of the GSN are logical and should appeal 
to all the stakeholders. As noted during this research, there is a constant challenge with 
the GSN in reaching out with strategic messaging. Those not directly involved in the 
GSN effort suffer greatly from knowledge gaps on its status and intent. 
The internal design elements also have a good fit. GSN architects/designers have 
done their homework. From a network perspective, most considerations seem to have 
been addressed throughout the development of the GSN concept. Nonetheless, it is an 
ambitious effort with considerable challenges. In many cases, future outputs and 
outcomes require policy-level decisions, especially for the participating PNs. In the short 
term this means that the information campaign is far from over. The main effort should 
be to inform the political and military policy level of the GSN effort. 
Based on the theoretical framework from Chapter II and the understanding of the 
overall Global SOF Network from this chapter, the next chapter will focus on the 
challenges for NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM as both Managers in Networks (a node in 
the overall GSN), and as Managers of Networks (within the national SOF network), as 
shown in Figure 16. 
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IV. CHALLENGES FOR NORSOCOM AND SWESOCOM AS 
MANAGERS IN THE GSN, AND MANAGERS OF NATIONAL SOF 
NETWORKS 
Chapter III analyzed the overall GSN, identifying the primary challenges for 
USSOCOM as the manager, initiator, and facilitator of the global network (see #1, in 
Figure 16). This chapter examines the PNs’ SOCOM (or the equivalent) perspective as 
member organizations in the GSN. More specifically, the focus is on the Norwegian and 
Swedish SOCOMs.   
For NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM to benefit and contribute as member 
organizations in the GSN, they need to understand Milward and Provan’s concept of the 
Management in Networks. There are certain management requirements for organizations 
that are members of a network to make sure the organization contributes and works 
toward the overall network purpose (see Table 2 in Chapter II, and Figure 16). 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM have taken active measures to join the GSN, but what 
else might be needed if the ambition is to be long-lasting active members? 
Second, if NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM want to strengthen, or establish, their 
own in-country network, they need to understand Milward and Provan’s concept of the 
Management of Networks. There are certain management requirements for organizations 
that have the responsibility to lead a network as a whole, to make sure the member 
organizations contribute and work toward the overall network purpose (see Table 2 in 
Chapter II, and Figure 16). 
To address the Management in Networks and the Management of Networks 
concepts, the chapter is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on how 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM, as organizations in a network (see #2, in Figure 16), 
can manage their GSN membership to enhance its contribution to the network as a whole. 
The second part focuses on how NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM can bridge out from 
the GSN and formalize their national partnerships into a “National SOF Network” (see 
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#3, in Figure 16).179 These two perspectives are separate and at the same time 
interrelated, and should be conducted in parallel to encourage the continuous co-
evolution of both types of networks.  
The diagram in Figure 16 illustrates the difference between Management of 
Networks, which is management of the whole, and Management in Networks, which is 
managing one’s organizational involvement in the network. 
 
Figure 16.  Management in networks vs. management of Networks. 
                                                 
179 The actual naming of the network may be tied to the main purpose of a developing network. This 
research uses the term national SOF network. One reason for this term is the natural legitimacy of 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM if initiating and taking the leadership role in this kind of national network 
effort. 
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There are myriad challenges that can be identified related to membership in an 
evolving global network as well establishing and leading one’s national network. We 
have identified what we consider the main challenges for initial action for NORSOCOM 
and SWESOCOM following GSN membership.180 
For NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM as managers in the GSN, we have identified 
eight challenges that should be addressed. These are: preventing perception of being a 
free-rider; maintaining recognition and visibility in a growing network; understanding the 
value of participation; establishing internal information sharing routines; building 
legitimacy towards other network members; working effectively with the network level 
manager; building commitment to the GSN overall objectives; and committing only one 
individual to network activities. These challenges and suggested counter actions are 
described in the first part.  
For NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM as managers of their national networks, we 
have identified ten challenges that should be addressed. These are: handling free-riders; 
bringing members onboard; getting members to behave as network members; seeing the 
network effort as worthwhile; handling internal frictions due to added workload; 
addressing stove-piping and “turf” issues; managing perception of formal leadership; 
uniting members toward a common purpose; understanding the value of contribution; and 
upholding member commitment over time. These challenges and suggested counter 
actions are described in the second part. 
The challenges identified are addressed through Milward and Provan’s five 
dimensions of management tasks (accountability, legitimacy, conflict, governance, and 
commitment). Table 4 summarizes suggested actions to address the different challenges, 
which are divided into the five dimensions of Milward and Provan.  
 
 
                                                 
180 The suggested actions are based on the authors’ understanding about the national SOF contexts in 
Sweden and Norway as well as on discussions with USSOCOM leaders, Norwegian and Swedish SOCOM 
commanders, and their respective national Liaison Officers at USSOCOM. 
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Table 4.   Suggested management actions to counter initial challenges. 
  
X = Direct relationship between actions and management challenges described in Chapter IV. 
(X) = The action has an indirect effect or is not directly described in relation to the specific management tasks in 
Chapter IV. 
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A. CHALLENGES FOR NORSOCOM AND SWESOCOM AS MANAGERS 
IN THE GLOBAL SOF NETWORK 
How can NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM manage their GSN membership? The 
framework for recommendations is Milward and Provan’s concept of Management in 
Networks, described in Chapter II (see Table 2 in Chapter II), where the Essential 
Network Management Tasks are divided into five categories: Management of 
Accountability; Management of Legitimacy; Management of Conflict; Management of 
Governance; and Management of Commitment.181 
1. How Can NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM Manage their 
Accountability within the GSN? 
Accountability is two-sided and entails both willingness to take responsibility for 
one’s action and an expectation that actions will be recognized. Accordingly, managers in 
networks have to make sure that their organization contributes to the overall network by 
setting aside specific resources to support network specific activities.182 
A potential accountability challenge for NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM is to 
avoid being perceived as a “free-rider.” Another challenge is to be recognized and visible 
in a growing network with many members (PNs).183 We suggest three initial actions to 
mitigate these accountability challenges. 
a. Participate in the GSN “Dialogue” through Disciplined Information 
Management 
At a minimum, a main effort should be to pass and receive information and 
participate in the GSN “dialogue.”184 Even if it is of interest for various staff sections to 
                                                 
181 Milward and Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks, 18‒24. 
USSOCOM has, according to this theory, the responsibility of Management of Networks, while 
organizations as member nodes have the challenge of Management in Networks. 
182 Milward and Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks, 18‒19.   
183 The growing number of LOs at USSOCOM J3-I may make it more difficult for individual partner 
nations to get recognition for their contributions. See Figure 15. Further, discussions with LOs at 
USSOCOM have hinted at difficulties to contribute with defined “national interests” into the J3-I process to 
identify common interests among partner nations. 
184 Advice given to the authors by Admiral McRaven, Commander USSOCOM, in discussions with 
the authors via APAN VTC, July 8, 2014. 
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communicate and participate in forums/working groups freely, a structured responsibility 
and rhythm for communication is suggested.185 The main reason is, for example, to keep 
track of requests, questions to be answered, and information that has been shared. This 
should be done to ensure dissemination of information, to avoid the unintentional by-
passing of the chains of command,186 to keep track of the responsiveness of own national 
SOF staff, and to keep track of how much staff effort goes into fulfilling the GSN 
objectives versus how much time the staff spends in fulfilling own organization’s needs 
and requirements. 
b. Make “Burden Sharing” More Visible 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM’s current dedicated resource for GSN activities 
is primarily their respective LOs at USSOCOM J3-I. These LOs are the means by which 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM ensure that their GSN involvement and various 
contributions to the GSN effort are visible and recognized within the USSOCOM 
“enterprise,” at other PNs SOCOMs, as well as at J3-I. 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM should consider making national efforts like 
their operations, regional SOF cooperation, assistance and training of partners, R&D, or 
combined procurement projects that can be seen as “burden sharing” visible and known 
within the GSN. 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM may need guidance in their efforts to aim for 
network objectives and burden sharing for the whole network. A comparative analysis 
between NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM’s interests in relation to GSN’s interests may 
identify burden-sharing possibilities for NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM that match their 
own interests. The purpose should be to identify both common interests and divergent 
interests. 
                                                 
185 USSOCOM shares this philosophy: The Command emphasizes dialogue and information sharing 
while having disciplined battle rhythm, for example, scheduled timings for recurrent VTCs, etc. Admiral 
McRaven, Commander USSOCOM, in discussions with the authors via APAN VTC, July 8, 2014. 
186 Network communication, for example: Commander USSOCOM’s direct dialogue with PNs’ LO at 
J3-I may keep the relevant TSOC “out of the loop” or “bypassed.” Major General Marshall B. Webb, 
Commander of Special Operations Command Europe [SOCEUR], gave this example in discussions with 
the authors during International SOF Conference, Tampa, Florida. May 22, 2014. 
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c. Dialogue with LO at USSOCOM about Contribution Perception 
Most importantly, routine checks via dialogue with the LO about the perception 
of the nation’s contribution to the network is important to avoid the label of “free rider.” 
Awareness among SWESOCOM and NORSOCOM leaders and staff about this important 
issue should underscore the need for regular participation with inputs to the GSN effort. 
2. How Can NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM Manage their Legitimacy 
within the GSN? 
Legitimacy is based on external reputation and social acceptance. It is often used 
as an alternative indicator of effectiveness and success. Managers of organizations in 
networks must establish the legitimacy of their own organization as a viable network 
player, while balancing legitimacy needs as an autonomous entity. It is relatively easy to 
lose autonomy and recognition as a member of a network with more than 20 members.187 
Legitimizing NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM GSN participation among other 
network members is to a degree achieved through current SOF cooperation in the 
European context: bilateral training arrangements between SOF partners, among NATO 
SOF, EU framework, and other regional cooperation, etc. However, GSN participation 
may require additional efforts on the global and strategic level to uphold reputation and 
acceptance. 
The main legitimacy challenges for NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM may be to 
get national stakeholders to understand the value of NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM 
participation in the GSN. In this regard, NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM may face 
challenges to establish national information/intelligence sharing through “SOF-channels” 
to the GSN. NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM may also have challenges to prove their 
legitimacy towards other more active and resourceful GSN members.188  
This research suggests four actions to meet these three legitimacy challenges: 
                                                 
187 Milward and Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks, 20‒21.  
188 Legitimacy issues among other PNs may rise should NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM be 
perceived as not contributing to the GSN processes. 
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a. Establish a National Information Campaign 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM initially need to establish a basic understanding 
about the GSN effort among national stakeholders.189 This point cannot be overstated. 
The research has identified areas of misunderstanding, misinterpretation, and lack of 
knowledge about the GSN effort, even within the international and U.S. SOF community. 
One theme has been the over-emphasizing of a single aspect of the GSN idea coupled 
with a lack of insight into the overall GSN concept and development.190 It would appear 
an initial national information campaign is needed for national stakeholders to focus on a 
thorough understanding of the GSN effort.  
Beyond the initial buy-in from stakeholders, NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM 
probably need to put emphasis on showing stakeholders the value of participating, both 
from a national SOCOM perspective and their stakeholder perspective. 
b. Ensure Visibility of Operational Burden Sharing 
The deployment of national SOF for international operations including 
cooperation and sharing of information and lessons learned among GSN members might 
be the most effective means to establish recognition within the GSN. Norwegian and 
Swedish SOCOMs could consider making their own SOF operations more visible within 
the GSN forums. More specifically, they could put effort into specific reporting and 
information sharing to the GSN audience during and after operations. 
GSN can provide a new forum for preventive security cooperation. For example, 
the J3-I ambition to develop and suggest multinational solutions on problems, including 
preventive efforts, should interest Norwegian and Swedish policy makers. In cases of EU 
or NATO non-consensus situations, the GSN can be seen as an alternative forum to 
generate an ad hoc coalition for crisis response or long-term preventive missions. 
                                                 
189 NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM’s stakeholders related to the GSN are here defined as national 
actors that might be affected by the GSN membership. The main stakeholders include the military 
leadership at the operational and strategic level, SOF tactical units, intelligence community, law 
enforcement, the Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
190 Class discussions about the GSN during the Network Design course at Naval Postgraduate School, 
2014. 
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Pending national will, this can be seen as both opportunities for “burden sharing” and as 
opportunities for the relatively small nations of Norway and Sweden to perform role 
model missions for obtaining credibility beyond their contribution. One example would 
be committing NORSOF or SWESOF to a long-term and focused capacity building effort 
toward a host nation in need of support. Such a mission could include a national 
comprehensive effort combining and coordinating military means (SOF trainers and 
advisors),191 diplomacy, law enforcement (trainers and advisors), and national aid into a 
focused whole-of-government approach.192 
c. Promote Information Sharing within the GSN 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM could enhance their legitimacy by identifying 
national information that could be seen as value-added if shared in a wider group of 
partners/nations. NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM could identify issues of interest to the 
GSN as well as of interest to their own organizations. An example could be R&D and 
procurement projects that are shared with other PNs. This may provide an opportunity to 
take on a leadership role on specific projects, hence enhancing NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM’s legitimacy among PNs. 
Sharing of sensitive information and intelligence is a challenging issue within the 
GSN.193 It should not hinder NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM’s ambitions. On the 
contrary, the outspoken USSOCOM awareness of the challenges hints at legitimacy 
benefits should NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM successfully establish sharing routines 
                                                 
191 In military terms these kinds of SOF Training and Assistance  missions are often described at the 
operational level as “shaping the environment” or “Phase Zero Operations.” NATO SOF nomenclature 
defines these missions as Military Assistance (MA). 
192 This option resonates with the national security strategies of Norway and Sweden, which seek to 
develop comprehensive, flexible, and proactive approaches to crisis management. The strategies 
acknowledge the veto-challenges in the UN and the consensus requirements in NATO and EU. However, 
the strategies do not elaborate on possible new approaches for security cooperation outside the framework 
of the alliances. Regjeringskansliet, Forsvarsdepartementet. [Ministry of Defense]  “Veivalg i en globalisert 
verden.” [Choices in a globalized world] Stockholm, 2013; Regeringskansliet [Swedish Government], En 
strategi för Sveriges säkerhet [A Strategy for Swedish Security], Ds 2006:1.  
193 Admiral McRaven acknowledges information sharing to be the most challenging issue among PNs. 
He strives to make USSOCOM a model for information sharing: rather share too much information than to 
little, or as he summarized the reasoning, advocating “aggressive information sharing.” See also Chapter III 
for how USSOCOM leaders have specified information/intelligence sharing as the main challenge for the 
GSN. 
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toward the GSN with their national intelligence community. In other words, even 
seemingly small amounts of information shared can enhance NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM legitimacy within the GSN. 
d. Build Intelligence Community Support  
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM need to establish support from their national 
intelligence agencies to enable occasional sharing with the GSN forum. Norwegian and 
Swedish intelligence agencies could be tasked to support their respective SOF HQs GSN 
membership efforts.194 This would require Norwegian and Swedish SOF commanders 
informing and encouraging decision makers in this direction. The intelligence community 
support would enable information sharing to the GSN, which in turn enhances 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM legitimacy in the eyes of other PNs.  
At a minimum, NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM will need to be well linked into 
their national intelligence agencies in order to follow up on information and intelligence 
that typically is not released through SOF channels.195 Thus, NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM will need to update PNs’ LOs at USSOCOM when their respective 
intelligence services have received SOF-related Norwegian or Swedish intelligence 
through bilateral intelligence-sharing agreements/channels.196 
3. How Can NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM Manage Conflicts within 
the GSN? 
Conflict among network participants is inevitable. On an overall network level, 
examples of potential conflict areas can be: free-riding, intelligence sharing, partner 
                                                 
194 Such a supporting effort can naturally be restricted to occasional sharing within the framework of a 
specific “Community of Interest.” One example to facilitate sharing is USSOCOM J3-I’s procedures that 
enable selected information sharing among interested nations on specific issues. Depending on issue, ad 
hoc-groups of nations can establish “working groups” where information is shared with involved and 
“trusted” partners. A working group of nations is also called a “Community of Interest.” This kind of 
intelligence agency support could also be seen as a driver to improve connectivity within the GSN through 
the use of BICES. 
195 Advice given to the authors by Rear Admiral Robert D. Sharp, Director for Intelligence [J2], 
USSOCOM, during International SOF Conference, Tampa, Florida. May 19, 2014. 
196 The intention is to make partners aware of valuable information sharing through intelligence 
channels, while acknowledging the already existing intelligence cooperation agreements. 
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nations not contributing with inputs regarding national interests and lack of contribution 
to build the common picture, “turf” issues between members, and issues related to 
political oversight.  
Networks are comprised of multiple members with different organizational 
objectives, stakeholder preferences, procedures, and cultures. Network-level managers 
need to minimize incidents of conflict. Although it can contribute to creative solutions, 
frequent conflict can undermine trust building. Managers in networks have an important 
role in supporting the overall network manager and work as a “linch pin” in trying to 
address these issues among the member nations and organizations. They have a 
responsibility to cooperate to ensure that problems and conflicts are resolved before 
intervention by the overall network manager.197 
The research has not identified any specific challenge for Commander 
NORSOCOM or Commander SWESOCOM to negotiate conflicts with other PNs. 
Consequently, there are no specific actions recommended.  
However, are the various commanders´ conferences and the biennial ISOF 
conference enough to enable the national SOF commanders to establish personal 
knowledge of one another and a sufficient degree of trust and informality? If Norwegian 
and Swedish SOF Commanders feel improvements are needed, reaching out to establish 
informal communication among SOF leaders is entirely in line with the GSN philosophy. 
4. How Can NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM Manage their Governance 
within the GSN? 
Chapter III assessed the GSN to be appropriately governed by USSOCOM as a 
network administrative organization (NAO).198 In this kind of structure, managers of the 
organizations in the network have a responsibility to work closely with the network-level 
manager. This means accepting that the network-level leader makes decisions for the 
whole network that may not necessarily be in the best interest of individual network 
                                                 
197 Milward and Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks, 21. 
198 See Chapter III, Analyzing the Global SOF Network, B. Analysis of the Network, 5. Performance 
of the Network. 
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members. The perceived loss of control can be difficult, but it is necessary for the 
sustainment and effectiveness of the network as a whole in accomplishing its goals.199  
Milward and Provan’s notion of loss of control to the lead administrator 
(USSOCOM) is assessed to be of less concern for Norway and Sweden as GSN 
members. Instead USSOCOM, as the leader/manager (NAO, coordinator, facilitator) of 
the voluntary non-obligation network for information sharing and identifying common 
interests among members, should be seen as providing opportunities for the members to 
exploit if militarily feasible and politically appropriate.200 
The main governance challenge identified for NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM is 
for them to be able to work effectively towards the network level management 
(USSOCOM J3-I).201 The project suggests three initial actions to meet this governance 
challenge:  
a. Designate a GSN Network Manager Function: A Reach-Back Capacity 
for the LO 
The Norwegian and Swedish LOs at USSOCOM J3-I facilitate NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM’s ambition to work closely with the network managers at USSOCOM. 
However, to improve the interaction with the central hub in the GSN, the national 
SOCOMs might consider a designated reach-back capacity—a Network Manager—for 
the GSN membership at their HQ.  
The management responsibility within the HQs of NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM for GSN engagements could be appointed to a section or individuals in 
line with the concept of Management in Networks. For example, a “Network Officer” 
may be appointed capable of advising the Commander NORSOCOM and Commander 
                                                 
199 Milward and Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks, 21. 
200 In other words, the GSN cannot make decisions: USSOCOM J3-International is facilitating PNs’ 
identifying common interests, suggesting multinational preventive solutions, and establishing “coalitions of 
the willing,” based on national decision making on different issues. Further, J3-I supports various 
Commanders (USSOCOM, TSOC, Partner Nation SOF) with multinational perspectives and options. 
201 Potential issues related to respond to/communicate with the LO/J3-I at USSOCOM could include: 
J3-I expectations of inputs from PNs’ policy level regarding national interests, great variety of topics, and 
infrequent communication. 
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SWESOCOM of GSN matters, supporting and directing and the LO at USSOCOM, and 
have the seniority to liaise with national agencies and departments.202 
An additional objective in establishing a network manager for the GSN 
membership is to make the national LO at USSOCOM, and Norway and Sweden as PNs, 
more influential and contributing to the GSN through active communication, hence also 
supporting the challenges of accountability described earlier.203  
b. Facilitate Information Management: Separate Network Communication 
from Formal Communication 
The communication topics between the LOs and their parent staff can vary 
between training events for a few SOF operators, procurement and R&D projects, and 
reporting from ongoing operations, to sensitive national strategic issues. Therefore, the 
communication should logically pass through the Chief of Staff (COS) of the national 
SOCOM for distribution. Alternatively, networked non-hierarchical communication 
could reduce the risk of information overload on the COS, improve the speed of 
communication and transfer of information, decrease the response time to questions 
(including to a potential national network of agencies and departments). This means that 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM’s information management have both 
formal/hierarchical and informal/heterarchical aspects. 
Some discussion about information management in both formal and informal 
communication is probably needed. How do the SOCOMs communicate effectively, keep 
track of messages, and avoid unintentionally bypassing nodes that might need to be 
informed?204 A natural guideline for communication should be for everybody involved to 
                                                 
202 The organization of a “reach-back” capacity could be considered with how connections and 
communication are conducted with national partners: perhaps the “reach back” staff function (the national 
GSN manager) should be the main node for communication or networking with national partners. This idea 
of a dual use of the network manager to also manage a national network is elaborated in Section B.   
203 According to Admiral McRaven, active communication should include an overall attitude that 
information should move more quickly. It is about passing and receiving information. This might require 
leadership efforts to “drive people to talk” within the network. McRaven (Commander of USSOCOM) in 
discussions with the authors via APAN VTC, July 8, 2014. 
204 An example is communication about U.S. SOF issues. To whom do we communicate? And who 
should be informed? The U.S. Military Attaché, SOCEUR, or other TSOCs, NSHQ, HQ USSOCOM, the 
Norwegian/Swedish embassy in Washington, or the planned U.S. SOLO positioned in Norway? 
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distinguish between “informal” network communication and the sometimes necessary use 
of formal or “official” communication using the hierarchical or reporting structure (chain 
of command and official channels).205 Examples of the latter would naturally include 
planning, reporting, and requests related to operations. 
GSN topics will likely affect most of staff sections at NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM. For example, relations with the intelligence community should naturally 
be done through the J2 section while other issues require the commanders’ attention. A 
national network manager would probably have to coordinate closely with the COS and 
the information manager within HQ. 
c. Strengthen the Communication Infrastructure 
Special attention is required for connectivity. Logically, a well distributed, 
functional, and effectively used BICES system forces members and nodes into the 
network.206 BICES may as well be sufficient for most national communications between 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM and their LO at USSOCOM. However, the reality is 
that most of the national communication within NORSOF and SWESOF communities is 
conducted on national secure communication systems, leaving the national LO at 
USSOCOM somewhat “out of the loop” and unable to communicate on those systems. A 
wider distribution of BICES and an effort to increase the use of it as a mean of 
communication between national entities may support the GSN effort. But, once again, 
the reality of current distribution and frequency of use of BICES points to a 
complementary need for connecting the national LO at USSOCOM into a national secure 
communication network. 
Establishing secure national communication inside the national offices in 
USSOCOM J3-I could address information issues and would increase the LO’s ability to 
                                                 
205 This distinction is in general natural and is normally an unspoken guideline for any communication 
in organizations. The point is to keep communication disciplined, specifically in regards of ensuring formal 
communication passing through the hierarchical chain of command. Noteworthy, though, informal 
communication can also be conducted according to a disciplined battle rhythm. 
206 NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM are currently using the NSHQ distributed BICES. How these 
systems work in relations to the U.S. BICES-X has to be clarified. NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM should 
ask USSOCOM for a timeline regarding the distribution of the U.S. BICES-X framework. 
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contribute in scenarios of national crisis, address the need for discussions of sensitive 
national issues, and avoid lost opportunities of reporting and communication. Selected 
information sharing in “groups of interested” within USSOCOM J3-I might require 
communication on national channels. Also, a national secure communication system 
might support the frequency and quality of communication with the national GSN 
network manager function. Further, it may support NORSOF and SWESOF visibility as 
burden sharers and contributors to the GSN. For example, their LO’s at J3-I direct access 
to current national SOF reporting, through a national secure communication system, 
might provide opportunity to share selected information within the GSN. In other words, 
the effort to distribute and increase the use of BICES does not exclude connecting the 
national LO at USSOCOM to the national communication system. 
5. How Can NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM Manage their Commitment 
within the GSN? 
Milward and Provan argue that it is critical for network sustainability that 
managers at both the network level and the individual organization level work to 
institutionalize key network relations. Commitment guarantees that relations are not 
based purely on personal ties of a single individual in each network organization. 
Participating organizations need to commit resources and personnel to the network 
relationship that goes beyond a single individual. Managers in Networks need to build 
commitment in their organization to the goals of the network as a whole. One way is to 
ensure that multiple people are involved. When support to the network is built through 
the organization (instead of individuals) the commitment to the network becomes 
institutionalized.207  
Foreseen commitment challenges for NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM might 
include difficulties in building commitment to the objectives of the overall GSN within 
their own staffs/organizations because of lack of understanding and priority. In addition, 
related to such a challenge might be the issue of NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM 
participating in GSN activities with only single individuals. 
                                                 
207 Milward and Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks, 24. 
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There are five initial actions that could be considered to institutionalize the GSN 
commitment and membership in Norway and Sweden: 
a. Build Policy Level Support: GSN as a Strategic Option  
The GSN concept may be addressed at the policy level as a “strategic option” 
enabling new avenues for security cooperation. The objective could be to get the GSN 
membership and mechanisms grounded at the national strategic level as facilitating non-
alliance alternatives for both crisis prevention and crisis management. To achieve this 
goal requires NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM to thoroughly inform the national military 
leadership and the Department of Defense of the GSN (J3-I) concept of identifying 
common interests among PNs, suggesting multinational preventive solutions, and 
establishing “coalitions of the willing” based on national decision making. 
A strategic level commitment to the GSN effort may in turn support other national 
entities’ commitment to NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM’s network membership (see 
also the following section about a potential national SOF network).  
b. Build Policy Level Support: Active Dialogue with the Policy Level 
Communication with the policy level should get special attention at NORSOCOM 
and SWESOCOM if they are striving to optimally contribute and benefit from the GSN 
membership. Beyond a necessary understanding among relevant civil servants in 
concerned departments (e.g., Department of State, Department of Defense) through an 
information effort by NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM, the dialogue must be kept active. 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM would benefit from insights of relevant policy goals 
when their LO at USSOCOM J3-I interacts in the efforts to identify common interests 
and collaborative opportunities among the PNs. Otherwise, NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM have a challenging task to provide their LOs with policy documents and 
guidelines regarding inputs to the J3-I strategic coordination process.208 
                                                 
208 Discussions with NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM leadership have touched on the issue of what 
kind of inputs to the J3-I process (in identifying common national interests among PNs) should 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM provide to their LOs. 
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USSOCOM J3-I’s ambition to establish “a common picture of PNs interests” 
through PN inputs is a foundation for J3-I to be able to look ahead and suggest 
collaborative and multinational solutions on issues. Thus, beyond forwarding the national 
policy documents to the LO as national inputs to the GSN common picture, identifying 
relevant Norwegian and Swedish national interests may require an initial outreach from 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM to the national policy level.209  
c. Launch an Internal Information Campaign 
Internal knowledge about the GSN effort and development should be enhanced 
through briefings within NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM staffs and at tactical SOF units. 
This could get more individuals and staff sections involved in GSN forums (supporting 
more active GSN communication), and improve overall understanding of the GSN within 
the Norwegian and Swedish SOF communities. In turn, this would probably support 
national interaction with the LOs at USSOCOM. The knowledge about purposes and 
possibilities of the LO position and GSN membership can increase both PN inputs to the 
GSN as well as easier identification of potential benefits, such as training opportunities 
and R&D projects.210 Briefings could be conducted by the national LOs at USSOCOM 
when in Norway and Sweden. 
d. Establish a Network Manager 
Formalizing a national network manager (“reach-back capacity”) assisting and 
directing the national LOs at USSOCOM J3-I, described earlier under governance, will 
support organizational commitment. As noted previously, this responsibility should not 
depend on individuals.  
                                                 
209 The authors acknowledge challenges related to such an outreach to the political level. This 
underscores the requirements for a conscious national information campaign. The GSN ambitions and ideas 
must be explained in order to not “scare the politicians” with notions of SOF foreign policy ambitions. 
210 Communication directly between the national LO and the tactical SOF units might be another 
argument for including the LO in the national communication system. As touched on previously, the 
BICES system at the tactical SOF units should not exclude this action. 
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e. Formalize Objectives of the GSN Membership 
The GSN is an informal network striving to minimize bureaucracy and 
formality.211 However, to support commitment from the organization, within 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM it may be decided to internally institutionalize the 
membership by announcing the ambitions. Thus, the GSN membership, including the 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM objectives and levels of commitment related to the 
network, could be formalized in their internal policy documents. 
The next section will address challenges and provide proposals on how 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM can create and enhance their own in-country networks; 
which is Management of Networks. The GSN membership can potentially support such 
an effort by providing national partners with access to GSN information. At the same 
time, an improved national SOF network can possibly make NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM better contributors to the GSN effort if provided timely national 
information from the various entities. 
B. CHALLENGES FOR NORSOCOM AND SWESOCOM AS MANAGERS 
OF A NATIONAL SOF NETWORK 
The participation and membership in the GSN can be a driver to create or improve 
a national SOF network for NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM. Overall, the national 
agencies and departments can potentially benefit from the GSN connections, access, and 
resources. In turn, a more efficient national SOF network can enhance Norway and 
Sweden’s contribution to the GSN through enhanced information sharing and the ability 
to generate holistic approaches to new challenges. Therefore, one could argue that the 
GSN and a national SOF network will mutually nurture each other. Following that 
argument, not exploiting the GSN development and membership into strengthening a 
national network can be seen as a missed opportunity. 
An underlying assumption in this section is that tangible improvements of 
interconnectedness between national SOF partners are unlikely unless the initiative is 
                                                 
211 The only formality required for J3-I representation, and in a sense for a GSN membership, is to 
negotiate agreements and status of the individual LO positioned at USSOCOM. 
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launched from NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM. This could be a supporting argument for 
creating a national network unless the current status of national interconnections is 
satisfying for NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM. Regardless, the notion of contributing to 
the GSN by enhancing the information sharing might require efforts to better “connect 
the nodes” from a national perspective.212 In this regard, with conscious efforts to be an 
active member of the GSN, the national connections will likely also improve.213 The 
efforts as Manager in Networks, described earlier in Section A, to inform national 
stakeholders about the GSN and to institutionalize the network membership can create 
widespread national understanding about the GSN. Hence, those actions can directly 
support NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM as potential Managers of a National Network. 
Ultimately, to actively disseminate information about the GSN contributes to identifying 
opportunities and possible benefits of the GSN membership for the nodes in a national 
network. 
Development of a national network will require NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM 
to take on the responsibility as Manager of Networks, leading a whole network (see #3 in 
Figure 16), as USSOCOM has done within the GSN. The framework for the 
recommendations will be Milward and Provan’s five dimensions of Management of 
Networks, described in Chapter II, (see Table 2 in Chapter II). 
As mentioned earlier, we have identified ten challenges that could be addressed 
by NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM as managers of their national networks. These are: 
handling free-riders; bringing members onboard; getting members to behave as network 
members; seeing the network effort as worthwhile; addressing internal frictions due to 
added workload; handling stove-piping and “turf” issues; addressing the perception of 
formal leadership; uniting members toward a common purpose; understanding the value 
of contribution; and upholding member commitment over time (see also Table 4). 
                                                 
212 Connecting the nodes in a national network might support the creation of a better holistic “picture” 
of national interests. 
213 Active membership in the GSN will likely require NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM to increase 
outreach for information among national entities (stakeholders), and hence communicate more frequently 
among national partners. Chapter II describes how active communication strengthens ties between nodes. 
Chapter II also describes that the density of network ties often is directly related to effectiveness. 
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1. How Can NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM Manage Accountability in 
their National SOF Networks? 
Milward and Provan argue that networks are essentially cooperative endeavors. 
However, even in the case of principal agreements of sharing the work in a network, it is 
relatively easy to evade responsibility and assume that someone else will be responsible 
for a network activity. Managers of Networks have a major responsibility monitoring 
participation among member nodes and to protect against the “free rider” problem. 
Network managers should reward members (organizations) who take on a broader 
network-level perspective and responsibility by aiming also to achieve network 
objectives. In a network, incentives take the place of a chain of command.214 
The main accountability challenge identified for a national network may be “free-
riding” among partners. The one suggested action to address this challenge has to 
consider the voluntary aspect of the network, as well as the challenge to get partners on 
board: 
a. Address Expectations of Contributions Early in the Evolution  
The guidelines from Milward and Provan (see also Table 2 in Chapter II) are 
applicable for NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM if a national SOF network is established. 
However, this point needs to be made during the “organizing phase” of the network. 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM should not only address potential benefits (incentives) 
for the members when bringing them to the network. Their staffs should also consider 
addressing the expectations for network members from the beginning. 
The disparity of potential network members spanning tactical SOF units to 
intelligence agencies and policy-level institutions (see sociogram, Figure 17) calls for a 
wide variety of expectations on contributions to a national network. Also, it will probably 
                                                 
214 Milward and Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks, 18. It is 
the role of the network manager to try and work around free-riders or even to encourage other network 
members to exclude these free-riders from beneficial network activities. Network members acknowledging 
the network-level objectives and perspectives could be rewarded by the network manager through 
providing available resources. 
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require some patience before members can be expected to “deliver.”215 General 
expectations of contribution could be related to the overall purpose and be widely 
addressed, while specific expectations can be discussed with members, respectively.216 
Also, accountability issues could initially be expressed in general terms, for example, as 
outspoken awareness from NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM to avoid free-riding among 
members.   
2. How Can NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM Manage Legitimacy in 
their National SOF Networks? 
As was described earlier, legitimacy is based on external reputation and social 
recognition and is often an indicator of effectiveness and success. Network managers 
must consider both the internal and external legitimacy of the network, something that 
can be a considerable task for Managers of Networks. Externally, managers need to be 
able to attract new members, generate good publicity, and generally, prove to outside 
groups that the network is a worthwhile entity effectively addressing complex public 
problems. Internally, managers need to maintain the legitimacy of the network to member 
organizations by encouraging and enabling interaction, providing resources, and ensuring 
that member organizations behave like they are part of a network. Building network 
legitimacy (support and recognition) can in practice be done through simple activities 
such as hosting regular meetings, regularly talking to network members, and distributing 
newsletters to members and other interested parties.217 Examples of this within the GSN 
are USSOCOM J3-I’s Think Tank series, monthly newsletter, and bimonthly “deep 
dives.”218 
                                                 
215 As a comparison and described in Chapter III, GSN architects are well aware that PNs’ (member 
nodes) opportunities to contribute may shift over time.  
216 For more about the network’s purpose, see actions to counter legitimacy challenges in the 
following sub-section. 
217 Milward and Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks, 19‒21. 
218 The J3-I Think Tank series is an unclassified, informational briefings delivered by a prominent 
subject matter expert on an issue of current interest to the SOF community, follow by a moderated 
discussion with the virtual attendees through the APAN system. Bimonthly, USSOCOM hosts what it calls 
“deep dives” in the different regions of the world, focusing on the current and emerging challenges, and 
discussing potential solutions. The deep dives are done on classified VTC, and all the members of the GSN 
are invited to participate. 
 100
Potential legitimacy challenges related to a national network include challenges to 
get partners on board, get members to cooperate as network members, and to get 
members and internal SOF personnel to see the network effort as worthwhile. This paper 
puts forward six actions to counter these challenges: 
a. Launch an Information Campaign 
From an external management perspective, NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM 
initially need to get national members on board. Earlier suggested efforts to manage 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM’s membership in the GSN by establishing a basic 
understanding of SOF and the GSN among national stakeholders through a 
comprehensive information campaign would also benefit ambitions to institute a national 
network. Thus, stakeholders could already be informed about NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM’s ambitions with the GSN membership. This may include possible benefits 
for partners and support requests from NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM in their effort to 
be active members. 
Some members may be easier than others to connect into a network. Stove-piped 
and bureaucratic agencies and departments may need more incentives than others before 
committing to network contribution. NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM need to identify 
participation advantages for potential members. As Admiral McRaven advised, “You´ve 
got to be able to give something to your interagency. Find out what is the touch point to 
bring the interagency to you.”219 For example, the Norwegian and Swedish intelligence 
community and law enforcement can, through NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM, get 
access to GSN information and working groups as well as establishing an alternate access 
to their U.S.-equivalent agencies through the GSN/USSOCOM interagency network.220 
A more specific advice can be for NORSOCOM J2 and SWESOCOM J2 to bring 
national intelligence agency and law enforcement representatives to GSN/USSOCOM-
                                                 
219 McRaven. In discussions with the authors via APAN VTC, July 8, 2014. 
220 Ibid. 
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hosted tabletop exercises regarding SOF intelligence.221 In other words, the GSN 
membership can be leveraged when improving or establishing a national SOF network. 
b. Leverage Existing Information-Sharing/Collaboration Forums 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM could consider how existing national 
information-sharing forums could be leveraged to support their objectives. For example, 
participating in the Swedish Council against Terrorism might support SWESOCOM as an 
active contributor of information sharing within the GSN.222 (See also sub-section 4 
about Managing Governance later in this chapter). 
c. Host Regular Network Meetings and Keep the Networked Members 
Informed 
To enable internal legitimacy in a national network NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM could host regular meetings with various members,223 as well as reach out 
and talk to individual members. Lessons can be drawn from Admiral McRaven’s 
deliberate effort to drive communication in the GSN. The Admiral relates to his weekly 
VTCs: “I sometimes ask questions that I already know the answer to, in order to force 
people to communicate.”224   
d. Strengthen the Communication Infrastructure 
To enable information sharing and interaction, including supporting the network 
manager to reach out with legitimacy-enhancing information and communication, 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM may consider additional distribution of national secure 
communication means among national network partners. Another possibility is to ensure 
wide distribution of BICES and enforce a more frequent use of that system.  
                                                 
221 Rear Admiral Robert D. Sharp gave this advice during discussions with the authors during ISOF 
Conference, 2014. 
222 In Sweden, for example, the Interaction Council against Terrorism includes 14 agencies divided 
into various working groups. Säkerhetspolisen [Swedish Security Service] Säkerhetspolisens årsbok 2013 
[Swedish Security Service Yearbook 2013] Edita, April 2014, 14. 
223 The disparity of the members may call for dividing various members into working groups. 
224 McRaven, in discussions with the authors via APAN VTC, July 8, 2014. 
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e. Share Resources 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM could also reflect on what resources, 
capabilities, and actions NORSOF and SWESOF can provide to encourage and recognize 
network membership. For example, NORSOF and SWESOF should provide specific 
training, equipment, and/or operational support for network partners. Partners should be 
invited to specific events to receive recognition for network contribution. National 
partners should get access to GSN information and forums. 
f. Define Network Purpose 
Finally, to enable legitimacy a network purpose should be defined. NORSOCOM 
and SWESOCOM may formulate this purpose in association with national partners. 
Anklam states that the first phase of creating a network is to establish the network 
purpose. To have a shared purpose is one of the most important factors when it comes to 
encourage network member collaboration within the network (see Figure 2). 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM should define one overarching purpose for a national 
network to support both internal and external legitimacy. Member organizations will in 
addition have their own purposes and agendas for participating. 
A national SOF network may have an overarching purpose to connect entities not 
previously cooperating and improve national information sharing in order to support and 
improve national capacity to counter complex, globally networked, and border-crossing 
security threats.225 The purpose also could be nested with the Norwegian and Swedish 
security strategies.226 The purpose of a national SOF network could be a combination of 
Anklam’s mission, idea, and learning (see Figure 3 in Chapter II). 
For example, an overarching purpose for a national network could be: 
To be a low-cost, innovative, problem-solving network connecting 
contributing entities in order to create holistic approaches to new security 
                                                 
225 The authors acknowledge that there are already-existing networks among law enforcement, 
security services, and intelligence agencies in Norway and Sweden who share information related to 
criminality, terrorism, etc. 
226 Official USSOCOM documents and information folders describe and illustrate how the GSN effort 
is nested with U.S. strategic directives and documents. See USSOCOM, SOF 2020 Global SOF Network. 
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challenges for the national leadership. Continually, be able to share 
information and grow its knowledge to enhance its performance, and keep 
up with the changing threat environment. 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM’s main purpose for the GSN membership should 
be known among the national network members. They need to understand some of 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM’s incentives and drivers for initiating a national 
network. NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM’s purpose for the GSN membership could be 
in line with:  
To be an active and contributing member in the GSN by clearly defining 
the national interests, sharing and receiving information to increase the 
GSN’s ability to create a common picture and identify common interests 
between partner nations as well as to discover other valuable fields of 
cooperation. Based on national interests and political decisions, 
contribute to the burden sharing within the network. 
3. How Can NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM Manage Conflict within 
their National SOF Networks? 
Network managers need to minimize incidents of conflict among multiple 
members with different organizational objectives, stakeholders, procedures, and cultures. 
As Milward and Provan warn, “turf issues” between agencies and issues about resource 
disposition within the network can undermine trust building.227 
These warnings might call for an internal effort to conduct conflict prevention. A 
national SOF network consisting of various agencies and organizations with varied 
objectives and priorities might need some encouragement and support of delicate efforts 
to ensure understanding and contributions to a national network effort. 
Potential conflict when managing a national network include the following: 
internal frictions within NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM staffs due to additional 
workload not directly related to their “normal” tasks and activities. Also, “stove piping” 
and “turf issues” among member organizations may hinder sharing of information, which 
in turn could affect trust building. There are two actions presented to counter these 
challenges: 
                                                 
227 Milward and Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks, 21. 
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a. Promote Personal Relationships among Key Leaders and Stakeholders 
The relative small size of Norway and Sweden is in this case beneficial. The 
possibility to establish and maintain personal relationships among key leaders and 
stakeholders supports conflict prevention in a national network. An effort to establish a 
national network may require NORSOF and SWESOF leaders to put extra energy in to 
this effort.228   
b. Manage Network Activities as Obligatory Tasks for the Staffs 
Internal frictions within the NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM’s staffs related to 
workload and efforts not obviously directly related to their objectives might surface. 
Thus, requirements for managing a national network must be understood by the staffs. 
For example, distributing information and contacts between a national network and GSN 
nodes may pass through NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM increasing the amount of work 
regarding information management. To overcome these tensions NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM must hold network activities as obligatory tasks for the staff.229 
4. How Can NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM Manage Governance in 
their National SOF Networks? 
When most people think about networks, they often think of a group of 
organizations that collaborate with each other and govern themselves. However, during a 
network’s evolution some decisions will need to be made about how it should be 
structured and governed and how the governance form should be implemented. As 
described in Chapter II, this is what the authors call the Organize Phase (see Figure 2 in 
Chapter II). 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM have to consider the design choices when 
creating their network. For example, deciding which of Provan and Kenis’ three basic 
                                                 
228 Admiral McRaven advised the authors of the importance of establishing personal relationships 
among leaders. He gave several examples of when personal relations between leaders untied stovepipe 
issues between agencies and U.S. SOF. McRaven, Discussions with the authors via APAN VTC, July 8, 
2014. 
229 One notion to create a better understanding among staff personnel about a network effort could be 
to clearly divide the network actions from the hierarchical Chain of Command. The network itself takes no 
actions; instead, the network is the precondition for the Chain of Command’s actions. 
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forms of network leadership structure they will use (see Table 3 and Figure 5 in Chapter 
II). The design continuum is a good tool to use in this process (see Figure 7). Roberts also 
states that managers have to understand that network design is a matter of choice.  
Specific governance challenges for NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM could be: 
potential members who might view NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM as formal leaders of 
the network, which may negatively affect their willingness to volunteer for network 
membership or contribution. Also, the number and disparity of potential member 
organizations may prove a challenge in uniting toward a common purpose. Three initial 
main actions are suggested to meet these challenges: 
a. Implement Governance Form as a Network Administrative Organization 
(NAO) 
This research recommends NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM choose a Network 
Administrative Organization (NAO) form of governance. The number of potential 
network members paired with the disparity of these member organizations requires a 
centralized approach. The lead organization management approach is naturally rejected, 
at this point, due to the likely informality and voluntary style of an anticipated national 
network. The network administrative organization form of governance is about 
facilitating or hosting network activities and information sharing, in line with USSOCOM 
J3-I’s role in the GSN. It may be essential to explain this leadership role when bringing 
potential partners to the network. 
b. Make Dual Use of the National GSN Network Manager Function 
As Provan and Kenis advise, the governance form of an NAO will require 
designated resources at NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM, a network administrative 
function. However, a cost-effective and efficient solution may be found if a “reach-back” 
capacity—a national GSN manager—is established at NORSOCOM or SWESOCOM 
(described previously in Section A). Such a function could potentially be dual-use 
capability as a central hub when bridging out to a national network. That means that 
actions that have been implemented to manage the GSN membership at the national SOF 
HQs can be leveraged if establishing a national SOF network. As described earlier, this 
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solution may also support increased speed of communication between the GSN and a 
national SOF network, hence enhancing NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM as active 
members within the GSN. 
c. Link into Existing Information Sharing/Collaboration Forums 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM may consider linking into already existing 
security-related national information-sharing and collaboration forums, for example, with 
the earlier recommended working groups within the Swedish Council against 
Terrorism.230 In network terms, that would reduce the number of connections that need to 
be established and maintained individually. However, such an effort may be combined 
with establishing separate connections to some of these nodes in order to enable 
additional information sharing and cooperation (Figure 17). 
 
 
Figure 17.  A national SOF network with SOCOM as the manager of networks. 
                                                 
230 Interaction Council against Terrorism includes 14 agencies divided into various working groups. 
Säkerhetspolisen [Swedish Security Service] Säkerhetspolisens årsbok 2013 [Swedish Security Service 
Yearbook 2013], 14 
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The sociogram (Figure 17) illustrates how NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM could 
utilize existing information-sharing mechanisms supplemented with additional 
connections to important network partners. The GSN node represents various entities in 
the Global SOF Network.231 An example of a civilian company can be a shipping 
company affected by piracy. Armed Forces HQ includes operational and procurement 
Chain of Command, Service HQs, and supporting staff functions. 
5. How Can NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM Manage Commitment in 
their National SOF Networks? 
Network managers must recognize that all organizations and their representatives 
in the network are not equally committed to the network effort. Single organizations may 
be involved in several networks. Further, instead of saying that an organization is part of 
a network, it is often more correct to say that a particular program of an organization is 
part of the network. However, it is the task of the network manager to build and maintain 
commitment of all network members, even if not all members will participate to the same 
degree. 
Allocation of resources and benefits should be based on level of commitment. But 
resources should also be used to build commitment of important, but marginally involved 
members. A part of the commitment-building process includes providing information to 
members about what the network is doing and how it is contributing to overarching goals. 
Further, to ensure network sustainability network managers must work to institutionalize 
key network relations and ensure member organizations commit resources and personnel 
to the network relationship beyond single individuals.232 
For NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM, commitment challenges may include 
challenges to get members to understand the potential value of contribution to the 
network effort. Also, it could be a challenge to uphold members’ commitment to the 
network over time. This paper presents five actions to address these challenges: 
                                                 
231 USSOCOM J3-I; USSOCOM Interagency Network; and PN’s SOCOMs and tactical SOF units. 
232 Milward and Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks, 24. 
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a. Information Campaign: Define Possible Benefits for Member 
Organizations 
Reaching out from NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM to potential national 
members will be needed to attract their interest. The staffs should emphasize that it is a 
voluntary non-obligation network and acknowledge the reality that not all participants 
can contribute and benefit equally over time. However, this message should be combined 
with notions about expected contributions (see earlier section about accountability).233  
b. Trust-Building Efforts: Information Sharing and Personal 
Relationships 
As USSOCOM has done with the GSN effort, NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM 
could focus on trust building. Ensuring commitment to a network effort and information 
sharing requires established trust between partners. Personal relations among leaders are 
one step in this direction, and so are information-sharing.234 Sharing builds trust, which 
in turn leads to more sharing, which supports more trust as a mutually reinforcing 
mechanism. General McChrystal describes his efforts as commander of JSOC: 
We instructed our people to share more information than they were 
comfortable with and to do so with everyone who wanted to be a part of 
our network … [W]e widely distributed, without preconditions, 
intelligence we captured or analysis we’d conducted. The actual 
information shared was important, but more valuable was the trust built up 
through voluntary sharing with others.235 
Acknowledging that these experiences are from a time of war with high stakes 
and that a “post-war” period can reduce incentives to share, they nevertheless suggest an 
important role for leaders. NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM leaders could identify what 
intelligence or information could be shared and then show good faith by “taking the first 
step” to share this information to build trust. 
                                                 
233 Milward and Provan, A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks, 7. 
Milward and Provan acknowledge that management of commitment can conflict with accountability. 
234 USSOCOM, ISOF Conference 2014, Senior Leader Guide. 
235 McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 154‒155. 
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In line with the USSOCOM J3-I position, NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM also 
have to recognize the timeless challenges related to sharing intelligence by openly 
admitting that all information cannot be shared with everybody in the network at all 
times. 
c. Get Members to Institutionalize their Memberships 
When the initial identification of the participating nodes in the network is done, 
points of contact (POCs) should be established, including alternative channels and 
contact persons in the member organizations. That is, NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM 
should signal expectations towards participating organizations to institutionalize their 
network membership by involving more than single individuals. 
d. Promote “Success-Stories” from the Network 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM could promote network “success stories” to 
demonstrate network value,236 for example, describing concrete successful cooperation 
among network entities or recounting innovative solutions to complex problems. Even if 
communication and meetings might take place in smaller forums or working groups, 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM might highlight successful network activities and 
regularly communicate their accomplishments throughout the network in order to build 
commitment. 
e. Strengthen the Communication Infrastructure 
A possible commitment-building effort would be to provide resources for secure 
communication between the different national members. The creation of a single platform 
for network collaboration would increase the probability of network participation. 
                                                 
236 The idea of being able point to “success stories” from network collaboration has been suggested by 
LOs at USSOCOM when discussing the GSN. 
 110
C. SUMMARY 
1. Management of NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM’s GSN 
Membership: Management in Networks 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM have been foresighted in the placement of LOs 
at USSOCOM and are well positioned for an evolving GSN. The LO is a relatively low-
cost contribution to engage in a network with no formal requirements. The current 
complex security environment and constrained fiscal reality makes participating in a 
global network like the GSN potentially beneficial for a small nation. However, as the 
GSN evolves there are possible actions within the national SOCOMs that should be 
considered as member organizations in the network. Both network theory and discussions 
with GSN designers point to expectations and opportunities for NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM to contribute to and benefit from a conscious and active network 
membership.  
Options for consideration are NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM´s information 
campaigns to various national audiences in order to obtain buy-in from internal and 
external stakeholders. The HQs also could establish internal staff and communication 
routines to actively participate in the GSN dialogue. The appointment of a national 
network manager may enhance the support and guidance of the LO at USSOCOM/J3-I. 
To enable network participation, a robust communication infrastructure is needed to 
encourage the flow of ideas and information. To benefit from a GSN membership 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM need to do their share of “putting energy into the 
network.” In summary, resources (personnel and time) need to be assigned at 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM to manage the GSN membership in a trustworthy way. 
2. Management of NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM’s National SOF 
Networks: Management of Networks 
If NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM have ambitions to develop current national 
partner cooperation into an enduring networked approach, it will require dedicated 
resources and deliberate actions. The management of the GSN membership can be 
leveraged. National partners can find incentives to “buy-in” to a network should they be 
provided a new information channel (GSN information). Further, dual-use of a national 
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GSN manager (the manager in network) as also the central hub of a national network (the 
manager of network) may be both cost effective and efficient for distributing information 
between international and national nodes. However, a unifying network purpose should 
be formulated to enable legitimacy and support collaboration. 
Personal relations within the network and among organizational leaders can 
counter conflicts. The size and variety of organizations in a potential network based on 
voluntarism and informality call for a centralized facilitating approach—an 
administrative function managing the network. As a complement to establishing “their 
own” network connection to national entities, NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM also may 
consider linking into already existing security related information-sharing forums. 
In order to establish and sustain commitment to a national network NORSOCOM 
and SWESOCOM could address trust-building activities, such as information-sharing 
efforts, as well as information campaigns to describe potential membership benefits. In 
addition, hosting regular network activities among members may support legitimacy, 
strengthen relationships, and enable shared understanding on issues. To do this, 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM should strive for a single ICT platform for network 
collaboration. They may also be prepared to provide resources in order to distribute these 
systems to partners. Further, NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM should honestly and early 
indicate awareness of intentions to avoid “free-riders in the network, while also 
acknowledging the reality that contributions can vary over time and between partners. 
Within NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM’s staffs there has to be widespread 
understanding of the potential benefits, objectives, and challenges related to a network 
effort: working tasks for maintaining the network cannot be seen as secondary tasks for 
individuals directly involved. 
As defense analyst, Christopher Lamb concludes about SOF and interagency 
cooperation:  
Making collaboration the priority and changing one’s own organization to 
facilitate collaboration is painful. It is far easier, and often safer, to 
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promote the importance of collaboration without doing anything to irritate 
one´s superiors or subordinates.237 
Chapter V, which follows, summarizes the capstone project with conclusions and 
recommendations. The chapter puts forward a few recommendations to USSOCOM on 
how to continue and enhance the evolution of the GSN into the near future. Further, the 
chapter provides recommendations to NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM on how to 
manage their GSN membership as well as how to manage the initial phases of a potential 
national SOF network. 
                                                 
237 Lamb, “Global SOF and Interagency Collaboration,” 19. 
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V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this capstone project has been to address the following question: 
How can NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM contribute to and utilize the Global 
SOF Network to enhance SOF collaboration as a way to respond to 21st century threats? 
To address this question, we first introduced some basic concepts of social 
network theory and provided an overview of the GSN and how it functions. We then 
summarized the challenges NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM faced as managers in the 
GSN and as potential managers of a national SOF network. Recommendations then 
follow what we believe can enhance NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM’s ability to 
actively participate in the GSN. 
A. THE NETWORK APPROACH 
As early as 1996, John Arquilla and David Ronfledt proposed the concept that “It 
takes a network to fight networks.” Their idea did not get much attention at the time. 
Scott Morrison recently stated that in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Arquilla and 
Ronfledt brought the issue into sharper focus in a follow-on piece entitled “The Advent 
of Netwar (Revisited),” with the statement: 
It takes networks to fight networks. Governments that want to defend 
against Netwar may have to adopt organizational designs and strategies 
like those of their adversaries. This does not mean mirroring the 
adversary, but rather learning to draw on the same design principles that 
he has already learned about the rise of network forms in the information 
age. These principles depend to some extent on technological innovation, 
but mainly on a willingness to innovate organizationally and doctrinally, 
perhaps especially by building new mechanisms for interagency and 
multijurisdictional cooperation.238 
In accordance with Arquilla and Ronfeldt, most Western nations now understand 
that a single nation´s tools alone are inadequate in confronting the challenges of the 21st 
                                                 
238 Scott Morrison, “Redefining the Indirect Approach, Defining Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
Power, and the Global Networking of SOF,” Journal of Strategic Security 7, no. 2 (2013): 48‒54. John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds. “The Advent of Netwar (Revisited),” in  Networks and Netwars: The 
Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 15. 
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century. They are signaling the need for international cooperation and collaboration, 
intelligence sharing, interagency cooperation, and more flexible tools for implementing 
future solutions to destroy these interconnected, net-centric threats. The GSN is one 
example of this international effort. 
Collaborative initiatives are the backbone of the Global SOF Network and the 
operational success in countering current threats and preventing future conflicts lies in a 
comprehensive whole-of-government approach. 
The next two sections summarize what has been accomplished from a GSN 
perspective and from the perspective of NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM as GSN 
members. The main purpose is to provide NORSOCOM, SWESOCOM, and USSOCOM 
with recommendations on what needs to be done to support the continuing evolution of 
the network. The recommendations are derived from the analysis in Chapter III and 
Chapter IV, but are grouped in what we believe are the main themes that should be 
considered. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE OVERALL GSN INITIATIVE 
1. What Has Been Accomplished? 
As GSN representatives at USSOCOM define it, 
Global SOF Network represents the cornerstone of a new, prevention-
oriented security posture. As special operations forces around the world 
collaborate in prosecuting complex problems, a new synergy emerges that 
is stronger than the sum of its parts. Navigating and adapting in unfamiliar 
environments; engaging, partnering, and building trust; and problem 
solving amidst uncertainty will be core competencies for a globally 
networked SOF postured to combat the threats of today, and the future.239 
Operationally speaking, the GSN is a network of organizations with multiple sub-
networks that are physically dispersed. They create a global and multilayered structure 
and are built upon the framework of the U.S. SOF organization and technology. Unique 
personal relationships, the experience of SOF personnel from years of warfighting, and 
                                                 
239 Keenan D. Yoho, Tess deBlanc-Knowles, and Randy Borum,  “The Global SOF Network: 
Posturing Special Operations Forces to Ensure Global Security in the 21st Century,” Journal of Strategic 
Security 7, no. 2 (2013): 1‒7. 
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the trust that has been established within the SOF community provide the foundation of 
this network. The challenge is to maintain and extend this trust within the IA and the 
political community.  
The name of the network—the Global SOF Network—appeals to the identity of 
the members, regardless of nationality: Special Operation Forces emphasizes the people 
in the organization as the main strength. USSOCOM, through the GSN, advocates the 
need to cultivate this unique SOF culture and to continue to invest in people to be able to 
operate in any future environment..240 
As analyzed in Chapter III, the internal design elements of the GSN are a good fit 
with each other. GSN designers have done their homework. From a network perspective, 
most considerations seem to have been addressed throughout the development of the 
GSN concept. Examples include, creating a common purpose, creating a disciplined 
battle rhythm, and establishing planning processes that facilitate PN contribution and 
decision-making processes (see Figures 12 and 13 in Chapter III). Nonetheless, the 
development of the GSN is an ambitious effort with considerable challenges. For 
example, in many cases, future outputs and outcomes require policy-level decisions, 
especially for the participating PNs. In the short term this means that the information 
campaign to get stakeholders’ buy-in is far from over. Although the GSN ambition has 
attained momentum as one of the main strategic efforts for the future at USSOCOM, the 
current challenge for the network appears to be the understanding in the political and 
military leadership of the GSN concept.  
The next subsections give USSOCOM, NORSOCOM, and SWESOCOM 
recommendations for how to support the future evolution of the GSN towards its 
performance phase. As Morrison concludes, the SOF community is ideally suited to lead 
these innovative efforts and serve as an enabler and catalyst to engender greater 
multinational and inter-agency collaboration through a comprehensive network 
approach.241 
                                                 
240 USSOCOM, ISOF Conference 2014: Senior Leader Guide, 12. 
241 See also: Scott Morrison, “Redefining the Indirect Approach, Defining Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) Power, and the Global Networking of SOF,” Journal of Strategic Security 7, no. 2 (2013): 48‒54. 
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2. Recommendations for the Future: What Needs To Be Done? 
Acknowledging the exceptional effort already undertaken by USSOCOM 
regarding the establishing of a GSN, one can see that continued evolution would require 
additional efforts. Our recommendations are grouped under the following themes: 1) 
framing the GSN narrative; 2) getting stakeholders’ buy-in; and 3) strengthening network 
communication infrastructure. 
a. Framing the GSN Narrative 
The variation of declared purposes of the GSN effort and the overwhelming U.S. 
perspective in all the documents that have been produced regarding the GSN is probably 
a result of USSOCOM’s need to convince internal stakeholders of the concept. Also, it 
can be seen as a natural result of the ongoing dialogue of the network’s evolution and 
purposes, which can shift or be refined throughout time.  
USSOCOM should now expand its focus to support the PN’s national dialogue by 
framing the GSN purpose more clearly from a PN’s perspective: what’s in it for the PN? 
For example, USSOCOM could highlight the GSN as a forum for SOF collaboration 
(operations, training, and development), a framework for information sharing (improving 
the PN situational awareness), and a structure for discussion and identification of areas of 
common national interest. The network could potentially enable, increase effectiveness, 
and/or make the PN SOF operations more cost effective when addressing future threats. 
In doing this, the target audience is no longer the PN SOF communities, but the military 
leaders and the political leadership who are the decision makers and policy makers 
within the PNs. For example, Swedish and Norwegian participation is not intended 
primarily to support the TSOC and GCCs better with special operations forces and 
capabilities.242 However, GSN as a forum for potential action and collaboration, 
according to the national interests, should be illuminated for PNs’ policy makers. 
To create this updated narrative, the USSOCOM leadership should task the 
GMSC with leading the review, and the narrative should address the most important 
                                                 
242 This purpose is the most common in USSOCOM documentation and speeches. 
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participants- the PNs who contribute capabilities, access, and information to the overall 
GSN purpose. The J3-I Division should be responsible for updating the PN part of the 
narrative. It is crucial that during this process the PN LOs interact with their national 
headquarters to ensure that the national SOCOM leadership supports the narrative. The 
narrative also should play to the benefits of global SOF collaboration, since it is a 
framework for information sharing and enhancing the collective knowledge, and a forum 
for discussion and identification of areas of common national interests. The GMSC 
would then tie the J3-I product together with the IA and U.S. product into one document. 
USSOCOM should get the U.S. administration to reach out with the GSN 
narrative within the U.S. communities to enhance the network legitimacy internally. The 
next step is to get the U.S. administration to reach out to international partners to enhance 
the network legitimacy externally. When doing this, it is important to emphasize that 
network performance is dependent on PNs’ active contributions. A U.S. top-down 
blessing would possibly soften PNs’ internal challenges with information sharing and 
burden sharing to the GSN effort. 
The updated narrative would be an important statement to convince the PNs’ 
policy makers of the purposes and benefits of GSN participation. 
b. Getting “Buy-In” from Stakeholders’ 
All network members have to get commitment from their national stakeholders. 
For USSOCOM, as the main node in the network, this means that it needs to get buy-in 
from its internal U.S. stakeholders as well as the PNs. 
The first step in the process, after the new narrative has been updated, is getting 
the internal stakeholders’ buy-in. USSOCOM leadership has to sell the new narrative to 
the U.S. political leadership and the IA leadership to reinforce the importance of the 
GSN. Through this process, USSOCOM has to influence the U.S. administration to 
promote the GSN narrative when engaging with the PNs´ political leadership.  
At the same time, USSOCOM has to encourage the PNs’ SOCOM to sell the 
GSN narrative internally to their national stakeholders in order to build national support 
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for the GSN effort. It is also vital for PN SOCOMs to inform their political leadership so 
all can discuss the GSN effort and the potential benefits of participation. 
The next step to get stakeholders to buy-in is for USSOCOM to create a 
releasable version of the Global Campaign Plan-Special Operations (see Figure 10, 
Chapter III), which today is a U.S.-only classified document. A wider distribution of this 
plan will enhance the GSN members’ understanding of the U.S. global effort. 
Understanding the U.S. perspective, as the main node in the network, will increase the 
possibility of PNs’ contribution to the plan from their national perspective. It likely will 
prompt the PNs to create a similar document within their own nation, something that can 
exponentially increase the network’s ability to build a common picture and identify 
common interests. In summary, USSOCOM should initiate the process of making the 
Global Campaign Plan-Special Operations releasable to the different PN SOCOMs in 
order to increase the knowledge about U.S. goals. 
c. Strengthening Network Communications Infrastructure 
The ICT portal and web 2.0 are slowly moving from a simple face-to-face 
coordination interface to a common platform through APAN and BICES-X. In addition 
to these tools, USSOCOM has allocated PN office spaces for LOs to establish and access 
their national systems for quick and secure reach-back to their national SOF 
headquarters. 
The ICT framework within the GSN needs continual attention, funding, support, 
and a robust distribution so all members can use a single information platform. The 
ability to communicate with other GSN members on a singular platform is critical to 
improving the GSN performance and achieving the network´s purpose. A wider 
distribution of BICES-X and a dedicated effort to increase the use of it as the primary 
means of communication within the GSN is also expected to enhance network 
cooperation and collaboration.  
The network also will need to incorporate the three systems discussed earlier (see 
Figure 11, Chapter III): APAN for unclassified information sharing and collaboration; 
BICES-X for classified information sharing and collaboration; and finally national secure 
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systems within the national offices to make sure that the LOs are able to discuss with their 
national SOCOMs on national issues and at the same time be kept “in the loop” as long 
as the national system is the primary system used nationally.  
The reality of BICES´ current distribution and frequency of use points to a need 
for PNs to support distribution of the systems and funding to secure a swift rollout and 
promotion of BICES within the GSN. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NORSOCOM AND SWESOCOM AS GSN 
MEMBERS 
1. What Has Been Accomplished? 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM have been foresighted in placing LOs at 
USSOCOM/J3-I and are well positioned for an evolving network. Hence, being among 
the earlier participants in a growing J3-I supports national understanding of the GSN and 
its processes, and enhances the LOs’ influence within the J3-I Division. The appointment 
of an LO has been a low-cost contribution in this network; there are no formal alliance-
like requirements. Further, NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM’s leadership has actively 
participated in GSN activities and conferences and communicated with their LOs at 
USSOCOM. The leadership is well positioned to understand the GSN’s benefits and 
implications, but what else might be needed to be long-lasting active members, especially 
in terms of additional resources (personnel, time, and hardware)? 
2. Recommendations for the Future: What Needs To Be Done? 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM need to enable efficient network 
communication, build national stakeholder support, contribute to the GSN, and 
strengthen national interconnectedness among partners. Our recommendations are 
grouped into three themes: 1) managing communication and information flow; 2) getting 
stakeholders buy-in; 3) burden sharing; and 4) strengthening or creating a national 
network. 
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a. Managing Communication and Information Flow 
Organizationally, NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM should consider establishing a 
network management function to support and direct activities in the GSN. This 
management function could improve the commands’ cooperation with the GSN 
management level (USSOCOM), enhance active network participation, and better 
organize network related activities within their respective organizations. The function 
also should involve a “reach-back capacity” directing and supporting the LOs at 
USSOCOM/J3-I, as well as having dual responsibility as a central hub bridging out to a 
national network from the overall GSN. 
To make this network management function operational, NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM would need to expand and strengthen the communication infrastructure. A 
wider distribution of BICES-X and an effort to increase the use of it as a means of 
communication within the GSN is needed. In addition, connecting the national LOs at 
USSOCOM into a national secure communication network will strengthen their ability to 
support the LO with national information is warranted.243 In other words, the effort to 
distribute and increase the use of BICES should not exclude connecting the national LO 
at USSOCOM to the national communication system. 
The distribution of the BICES-X system should not be a U.S. responsibility alone. 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM have to support the effort of distributing the systems 
and, if necessary, supporting this effort with funds to secure a swift rollout. 
To support communications and flows of information, NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM need to have disciplined information management. For example, 
integrating GSN communication in the internal staff’s battle rhythm and consciously 
separating informal network communication from formal communication. A network 
manager must therefore work closely with the COS and the IM within the national 
SOCOM to ensure this integration. 
                                                 
243 A national secure communication system inside the national offices at USSOCOM/J3-I might 
support the frequency and quality of communication with the “reach-back capacity” and support 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM’s visibility as burden sharers and contributors to the GSN. For example, if 
their LOs at J3-I have direct access to ongoing national SOF reporting during operations through a national 
secure communication system, they then have the opportunity to share selected information at J3-I. 
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b. Getting Stakeholders’ Buy-In 
An information outreach to national stakeholders will require clarifying the GSN 
narrative. Network managers first need to be responsible to merge the updated GSN 
narrative from USSOCOM/J3-I with the national narrative in order to create an overall 
information campaign announcing the benefits of membership, and the potential benefits 
of creating a national SOF network.244 The narrative should play to the benefits of global 
SOF collaboration in enhancing the collective information sharing, building intelligence, 
and acting as a forum for discussion of areas of common national interests (see also 
Section D, Main Benefits). 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM also need to launch a focused information 
campaign to create a thorough understanding of the GSN among national stakeholders to 
enhance the probability for strategic-level utilization of the GSN membership. For 
example, enhanced understanding at national policy levels ideally would result in an 
active dialogue within the nation as well as the generation of relevant national inputs into 
the J3-I effort that identifies common interests within the GSN. Other prioritized targets 
for the information campaign would be those departments and agencies that can support 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM with the capabilities and information needed to 
participate in the GSN. 
An information effort directed toward NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM staffs also 
could increase internal understanding of purpose, objectives, and potential benefits and 
challenges to counter potential challenges, such as increased workload and internal 
commitment within own staffs. Further, understanding of the GSN among national 
intelligence agencies could increase the likelihood for information sharing with the GSN. 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM have to champion and promote the GSN to their 
national administrations as they engage with other GSN members. It is vital for the 
national SOCOMs to keep policymakers updated so all can mutually discuss the GSN 
efforts and potential benefits. 
                                                 
244It is crucial during this process for the network management function to interact with the national 
stakeholders to ensure that they also gain ownership of the GSN narrative.  
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In summary, the ideal of an information campaign would be to improve the 
legitimacy of NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM’s GSN membership, as well as enhance 
supportive commitment to the effort. 
c. Burden Sharing 
Burden sharing in a global SOF perspective can be done in many ways. However, 
deploying SOF to crisis regions is probably the most credible contribution. If UN, EU, or 
NATO opportunities drag on due to lack of consensus, GSN and J3-I can facilitate and 
support bilateral or multilateral opportunities for “preventive missions” that address, 
directly or indirectly, transnational and networked threats. Specifically, host nation-
invited “indirect approach” missions to build capacity of local security forces are a 
foreseen need and these host-nation requests may coincide with Norwegian or Swedish 
national interest. These types of missions open new possibilities for small-scale, long-
term comprehensive efforts as a national contribution. Diplomacy, financial aid, judicial 
support and advice, as well as SOF advisors/trainers can be combined in a unique effort 
from a “small nation” such as Norway and Sweden. 
A less visible but still important aspect of burden sharing is for NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM to provide relevant inputs regarding “national interests” to their LOs that 
help the J3-I’s efforts to identify PNs’ common interests and solutions. Obtaining this 
kind of information can be difficult from countries like Norway and Sweden who may 
have less outspoken, or distinct, national interests that may be relevant in the GSN 
processes. Nevertheless, NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM need to put an effort into 
providing information that can be used in the J3-I process of generating common 
interests. Creating this information will prompt an active dialogue at the national policy 
levels and in their various departments.245 If created, NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM 
could use their network management function to create a document explaining the 
national interest, which the LO at USSOCOM can use in the J3-I process of identifying 
common interests. Integrating the document in the J3-I process is a way to identify where 
                                                 
245 The policy level would include the military strategic leadership and relevant personnel in the 
Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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Norway and Sweden can utilize the GSN for national interests/benefits. Further, it is a 
method to signal commitment and build trust within the USSOCOM/J3-I. 
Finally, another possibility to contribute to GSN is for NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM to establish national information-sharing channels to provide GSN with 
national information. National intelligence agencies could be tasked to support 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM in their GSN effort. Acknowledging challenges in this 
regard, a minimum effort should be to establish trusted (personal) relationships with 
national partners and establish mechanisms to make sure that they are informed when 
certain (SOF/GSN-related) information is shared through other intelligence channels.246 
d. Strengthening or Creating a National Network 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM are well positioned as contributing and active 
members of the GSN. Although it is possible to be an active and contributing member of 
the GSN without creating a national network, creating a national network could add value 
to the whole system. We suggest creating ties between the international network 
membership (GSN), and the national network. Designing these networks should be 
conducted in parallel to acknowledge the continuous evolution of the overall network. 
Only if resource constraints hinder such a practice should a sequential effort be 
considered.247 The advantage is that the GSN and the national SOF network could 
mutually nurture each other and be a more cost effective and efficient way of building out 
the network. Hence, not exploiting the GSN membership and linking to a true national 
network can be seen as a missed opportunity. 
National network ties do more or less already exist; but what is needed in the 
initial phase is to formally establish a management entity that establishes overall purpose 
for the network and organizes the network stakeholders. This effort will require a delicate 
                                                 
246 The purpose is for the national LO at USSOCOM J3-I to be able to inform international partners 
(PN) that their nations have been provided Swedish or Norwegian information through, for example, 
intelligence agency channels. 
247 The advice of a sequential approach is made with an understanding of limited resources at the 
national SOF HQs. Therefore, a “one step at a time” approach might be the way ahead. Also, a solid GSN 
membership will probably support the establishment of a national network. However, some overlap 
between international and national networking efforts could be natural also in the earlier phases. 
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mix of informing stakeholders, attracting potential members, providing benefits and 
incentives, exploiting personal relationships, establishing communication routines, and 
formalizing the network’s design. A plan for how to establish the network may be 
required, however, the details for such a plan are outside the scope of this project. 
The size and variety of organizations in a potential national network requires 
some mechanism of integration as discussed earlier in this project. The NAO form of 
governance is one option, but it is important to explain its leadership role to potential 
partners to avoid the appearance of NAO having control over the network. 
The NAO´s challenges would be to create shared national network purpose. 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM in association with national partners could develop one 
overarching purpose that supports both internal and external legitimacy to get buy-in 
from stakeholders. The purpose has to be nested with the national security strategies and 
in addition, it has to be understood that each participating entity will have its own 
purposes and agendas for participation. 
The next step would be to establish buy-in from national stakeholders, like 
intelligence agencies, departments, and law enforcement agencies, to grow the network. 
NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM have to create incentives for these agencies and 
departments by identifying participation advantages. For example, the GSN membership 
can be leveraged to bring organizations into a national network by creating access to 
GSN information, working groups, and U.S.-equivalent inter-agencies that will be 
beneficial in a national context. To get organizations “on board,” NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM should start by selling the narrative of a networked approach and GSN, in 
general, and the national network, in particular. The policy level should get special 
attention in this regard to build the necessary support from the political leadership. 
Additional actions to enhance the legitimacy of a national network and support the buy-in 
effort may include trust-building activities such as having NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM take the first step and share their resources and information with their 
national network. 
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Finally, to increase the probability of network participation, NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM should aim for a single ICT platform for network collaboration. It could 
develop through a wider distribution of BICES among national partners or through 
dissemination of a secure national system. A single ICT system would enable information 
sharing, interaction, and collaboration, as well as enhance for the network manager 
function to share information between the global and national levels. To underline the 
importance of a single ICT system, NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM should be prepared 
to provide resources (hardware) to secure a wide distribution of the system. This could be 
another way to convince partners to commit to the network effort. 
Through the single ICT platform, the network management function could draw 
on GSN efforts to create and initiate network activities. For example, NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM could host regular group meetings with the members, as well as reach out 
and talk to individual members. Working groups could be formed to address specific 
topics through discussions and briefings aiming at increased knowledge and shared 
understanding, like USSOCOM/J3-I’s Think Tank series and bimonthly “deep dives.” A 
secure communication system, capable of hosting VTCs, would likely increase 
participation in network activities. Creating and distributing “newsletters” to inform 
about network activities can be another example of network activities that can reinforce 
the members’ commitment. 
e. Suggestions for the Way Ahead 
If NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM want to pursue our recommendation to create 
a national SOF network, they would need to formulate a plan for establishing, and 
strengthening the national network. Examples of issues to be addressed for such a project 
include: 
 Identify who are the obvious members and what other organizations are 
desirable participants.  
 Investigate how differences in classification of information and security 
measures between agencies and departments (for example, differences 
between the armed forces, law enforcement, and departments) can be 
managed if distributing a uniform ICT system among national entities. 
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 Identify the kinds of network activities that could be relevant to all 
members and frequency of these activities. 
 Explore whether LOs should be distributed within the network- 
permanently or on demand? 
 Identify metrics to evaluate network performance, and identify desirable 
outputs and outcome. 
 Formulate an initial communication plan to promote a national network. 
To complete the project, the last section provides NORSOCOM and 
SWESOCOM a summary of the main benefits for a PN as a GSN member. These 
benefits have been identified when doing the research and the analysis of the GSN 
concept and future planned efforts. 
D. MAIN GSN MEMBERSHIP BENEFITS IDENTIFIED FOR NORWAY 
AND SWEDEN 
This project has suggested that NORSOCOM and SWESOCOM can define their 
future contributions regarding the GSN. If our recommendations are pursued, additional 
resources (personnel, time, and hardware) will be required. However, we believe these 
are “low-cost” investments with high benefits.  
The main benefits identified for Norway and Sweden are: 1) developing 
connections that are already in place; 2) gaining new information channels; 3) realizing 
quick reaction time when reaching out for support; 4) gaining a new strategic option for 
security cooperation; 5) accessing enhanced opportunities for training and R&D projects; 
and 6) enhancing national interconnectedness. 
 Already in place global connections. As a GSN member the nation can use 
all the different connections currently in place to deal with national crises 
response and in planning for deliberate operations. 
 A new channel for enhanced situational awareness. As a GSN member, a 
nation has access to a broad information channel in case of a crisis 
involving national interest or to support the policy level following a 
potential threat. 
 Network connections that can enable quick reaction time. As a GSN 
member, a nation can rely on the whole network for support in a crisis 
response situation like providing access to resources not organically 
available in Norway or Sweden. For example, Airlift and ISR-
capabilities.248 
                                                 
248 Smethurst, in discussions during International SOF Conference, 2014. 
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 A new strategic option for security cooperation. The GSN membership 
and the J3-I mechanisms facilitate non-alliance alternatives for both crisis 
prevention and crisis management. For example, the J3-I ambition to 
develop and suggest multinational solutions may match national will and 
military feasibility when facing NATO or EU non-consensus situations.  
 Cost-effective collaborations. As a GSN member the opportunity for 
collaboration expands exponentially with every new member. For 
example, it enables identifying new opportunities for training, 
procurement of hardware, and R&D projects. 
 National interconnectedness. Being a GSN member can be a driving force 
to connect national partners and stakeholders together. For example, the 
access to new information and communication channels, think tanks, and 
cooperation forums can create incentives for national partners to increase 
cooperation as well. 
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